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I. INTRODUCTION 
Bogus refund schemes, i.e., schemes created to generate undeserved 
tax refunds, have long plagued the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”).1 In 
2011-2013, the IRS identified and stopped over $53 billion fraudulent 
refunds, yet paid over $10 billion in fraudulent refunds during the same 
period.2 Those bogus refunds, however, are not a new phenomenon: a 
2005 report by the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration 
(“TIGTA”) to Congress noted that in that year, there were approximately 
70,000 bogus claims for refund, totaling over $100 million.3 By 2007, 
the Joint Committee on Taxation (the “Joint Committee”), echoing 
TIGTA’s concerns, told Congress that bogus refund claims had created 
“unnecessary burdens on both taxpayers and the IRS by straining IRS 
resources and impeding effective tax administration.”4 
 
 1. See, e.g., Leslie Book, Closing the Tax Gap: Refund Anticipation Loans and the Tax Gap, 
20 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 85 (2009); George Guttman, Improper Refunds Sapping Billions; IRS, 
Treasury, Hill Seek Answers, 65 TAX NOTES 19, 20 (1994); Malcolm K. Sparrow, 1993 Report on 
IRS Vulnerability to Refund Fraud, TAX NOTES TODAY, Feb. 20, 1996, at 35-51, § 2.3.1; William J. 
Turnier, Electronic Filing: A Very Dubious Success, 59 TAX NOTES 569 (1993). 
 2. See TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., INTERIM RESULTS OF THE 2014 FILING 
SEASON (2014), available at http://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2014reports/
201440029fr.html. See also Gregory Wallace, IRS Paid $3.6 Billion in Fraudulent Tax Refunds, 
CNN MONEY (Nov. 7, 2013), http://money.cnn.com/2013/11/07/pf/taxes/irs-fraud/ (“The IRS paid 
out $3.6 billion in fraudulent tax refunds to identity thieves last year, according to an inspector 
general report.”). 
 3. See TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: 
APRIL 1, 2005-SEPTEMBER 30, 2005, available at http://www.treasury.gov/tigta/semiannual/
semiannual_dec2005.pdf [hereinafter 2005 TIGTA REPORT]. 
 4. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, DESCRIPTION OF REVENUE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN 
THE PRESIDENT’S FISCAL YEAR 2008 BUDGET PROPOSAL 186 (Comm. Print 2007) [hereinafter 2007 
2
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In response to both TIGTA’s and the Joint Committee’s concerns, 
in 2007, Congress enacted Internal Revenue Code (the “Code”) section 
6676,5 which gave the IRS the power to penalize erroneous and 
fraudulent refund claims.6 Congress later amended section 6676 in 2010, 
extending the section 6676 refund penalty to refund claims based on 
transactions lacking economic substance.7 
While well-intentioned, section 6676 has been feckless.8 For the 
five years between May 2007 and May 2012, the IRS assessed only 84 
section 6676 erroneous refund penalties, collecting roughly $1.9 
million.9 However, TIGTA found that for the approximately one-year 
period between June 3, 2012 and May 25, 2013, “the IRS could have 
potentially assessed erroneous penalties totaling more than $1.5 
billion.”10 This Article explains why those potential penalties have not 
 
JCT REPORT]. 
 5. Unless otherwise indicated, all references herein to “section” refer to the Internal Revenue 
Code of 1986, as amended. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-514, § 2, 100 Stat. 2095 (1986) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). 
 6. Small Business and Work Opportunity Tax Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-28, § 8247, 121 
Stat. 112, 204 [hereinafter Work Opportunity Tax Act]. 
 7. Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111-152, § 1409(d), 124 
Stat. 1029, 1070. Prior to 2007, there was no penalty for filing an “excessive” claim for a tax refund 
under section 6676. The predecessor of the current penalty based on erroneous claims for refund 
was first mentioned in a September 15, 2006 Senate bill that was ultimately not passed. See S. 1321, 
109th Cong. (2006). That bill proposed a 20% penalty for an erroneous claim for refund, and the 
authors of the bill stated as the reason for the bill, “the filing of erroneous refund claims is being 
used by some taxpayers to put a strain on IRS resources and to delay the resolution of tax matters.” 
S. COMM. ON FINANCE, TELEPHONE EXCISE TAX REPEAL AND TAXPAYER PROTECTION AND 
ASSISTANCE ACT OF 2006, S. REP. NO. 109-336 (2006). 
 8. Instead of fixing the penalty, at least one member of Congress is seeking to expand it. In 
2013, Rep. Jerry McNerney (D-CA) introduced H.R. 2740, the “Stop Outsourcing and Create 
American Jobs Act of 2013.” The bill would amend the section 6676 penalties by adding a new 
penalty for corporations claiming refunds related to tax haven countries. The text of the bill, in 
pertinent part, would redesignate subsection (d) as subsection (e) by inserting after subsection (c) 
the following new subsection: 
(d) INCREASE IN PENALTY IN CASE OF TAX HAVEN COUNTRIES.—In the case 
of claim or credit by a corporation for any excessive amount due for credits or refunds 
involving funds held or invested in a tax haven country (as defined in section 
6662(k)(2)), subsection (a) shall be applied by substituting “40 percent” for “20 
percent.” 
Stop Outsourcing and Create American Jobs Act of 2013, H.R. 2740, 113th Cong., § 3(d). 
 9. TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., THE LAW WHICH PENALIZES ERRONEOUS 
REFUND AND CREDIT CLAIMS WAS NOT PROPERLY IMPLEMENTED 2 (2013), available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2013reports/201340123fr.pdf [hereinafter 2013 TIGTA 
REPORT). 
 10. Id. 
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been assessed. 
Part of the blame for section 6676’s ineffectiveness is a lack of 
guidance regarding implementation, and that blame falls squarely at the 
feet of both the IRS and the U.S. Treasury Department (“Treasury”).11 
Since enactment, Treasury has failed to issue implementing regulations 
for section 6676, relying instead on the IRS to, in effect, make it up as 
they go along. That has not worked out so well. The IRS, in making it 
up, got it wrong at least twice and left its employees largely in the dark 
about how the penalty should be implemented.12 
Another part of the blame goes to Congress, which failed to think 
through material issues regarding section 6676’s purpose before passing 
it.13 As noted by the Joint Committee, the bogus refund claims 
highlighted in the 2005 TIGTA report were a major impetus for passing 
section 6676.14 Among other findings, that report found that taxpayers 
fraudulently claiming the Earned Income Tax Credit (“EITC”) were a 
significant part of the bogus refund problem.15 So what did Congress 
do? It passed a refund claim penalty that excluded EITC-based refund 
claims. 
The Joint Committee also foretold of the problems with 
administering the penalty, noting “the proposal (i.e., the new penalty) 
may lead to some additional complexity in the administration of the 
penalty provisions. For example, administration of the new penalty may 
be impacted by uncertainty regarding its application in cases in which 
present-law penalties also might apply.”16 Those prescient sentences 
presaged the morass that is the current state of section 6676. 
In 2013, TIGTA identified steps the IRS could take to correct its 
internal procedures to properly impose the penalty. In addition, based on 
 
 11. The IRS is a bureau of Treasury, and section 7805(a) gives Treasury the power to create 
the necessary rules and regulations for enforcing the Code. See I.R.C. § 7805(a) (2012). 
 12. See 2013 TIGTA REPORT, supra note 9. Specifically, the report noted that section 6676 
penalties have not been assessed because (i) IRS administration failed to provide guidance to 
employees about when the penalty should be assessed, and (ii) IRS Counsel provided incorrect legal 
guidance to IRS employees regarding the IRS’s authority to assess the erroneous refund penalty. Id. 
at 10. 
 13. See Christine S. Hooks, Spotlight on the Penalty for Excessive Refund Claims, I.R.C. § 
6676, INSIDE BASIS, Spring 2013, at 5, 5, available at http://www.fedbar.org/image-
library/events/2013-Annual-Meeting/Newsletter-Winners/TAX.pdf (“Despite the breadth of the 
penalty provision, it appears that Congress had in mind only a few types of excessive erroneous 
refund claims when it enacted the penalty.”). 
 14. The 2005 TIGTA Report is cited in the first line of the “Analysis” section of the 2007 JCT 
Report. See 2007 JCT REPORT, supra note 4, at 186. 
 15. See 2005 TIGTA REPORT, supra note 3, at 16. 
 16. See 2007 JCT REPORT, supra note 4, at 186. 
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discussions with IRS administrators, TIGTA noted that the IRS would 
seek to implement section 6676 penalties more aggressively in the 
future.17 Notwithstanding TIGTA’s suggested corrections, aggressive 
implementation only portends more problematic issues for section 6676, 
including: (1) the law is beset with unaddressed structural problems; (2) 
as drafted, implementation may violate the U.S. Constitution; and (3) 
well-represented taxpayers may be able to avoid the penalty. As one 
headline regarding the current state of affairs regarding the section 6676 
penalty noted, it is “A Tax Morass Only a Lawyer Could Love.”18 
This Article analyzes the problems with section 6676 as it currently 
applies and offers suggestions to change it. The Article begins by 
identifying the reasons section 6676 has been unable to accomplish its 
policy goals and then highlights problems on the horizon. It ends by 
suggesting legislative and regulatory changes that will ameliorate the 
problems with section 6676 and allow the law to accomplish the goals 
Congress sought to achieve through its enactment. 
Part II of this Article lays out the problems associated with 
erroneous claims for refund and past legislative attempts to deal with the 
problem, ultimately leading to the enactment of section 6676. Part II also 
explains generally how section 6676 differs from most other tax penalty 
provisions, and how those differences have hampered its 
implementation. 
Part III examines the problematic legal and policy issues the section 
6676 penalty raises. Part III.A explores administrative problems with the 
section 6676 penalty, and begins with an examination of the issues that 
have arisen regarding the penalty’s procedure and implementation. 
Many of those problems were on the horizon when the law was passed, 
but, to date, have not been addressed.19 One issue, regarding how to 
properly calculate the section 6676 penalty, was recently addressed by 
the U.S. Tax Court (“Tax Court”), and not in the government’s favor. 
Using the Three Stooges as an example, the section demonstrates how 
 
 17. See 2013 TIGTA REPORT, supra note 9. The report noted that the IRS stated, in response 
to TIGTA’s recommendation, that “a cross-functional team of affected stakeholders will determine 
the operational and procedural changes needed to integrate assessment of the erroneous refund 
penalty into the Campus Operations.” Id. at 2. My understanding of that corporate-speak suggests 
this is how the IRS states it will try to do better in the future. 
 18. Ilya Shapiro & Matt Gilliam, A Tax Morass Only a Lawyer Could Love, AMERICAN (Dec. 
10, 2012), available at http://www.american.com/archive/2012/december/a-tax-morass-only-a-
lawyer-could-love. 
 19. In what should be a textbook definition of understatement, the Joint Committee stated in 
2007 that, “depending on certain details of the proposal [section 6676] that have not yet been 
specified, the proposal may lead to some additional complexity in the administration of the penalty 
provisions.” 2007 JCT REPORT, supra note 4, at 186. 
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that Tax Court decision increased exponentially the procedural and 
administrative complexity of implementing section 6676. 
Part IV analyzes a number of outstanding legal and policy issues 
raised by section 6676. The section begins by examining how imposing 
the section 6676 penalties may not pass constitutional muster. Briefly, 
requesting a tax refund is a well-established, constitutionally-recognized 
form of First Amendment petitioning activity, and any infringement 
upon that right must provide certain procedural safeguards. As currently 
implemented, section 6676 has no such safeguards. The section then 
explores other unresolved legal and policy issues on the horizon for 
section 6676. 
Part IV.C explains a more practical problem with section 6676: the 
penalty may be avoidable by well-represented taxpayers. The section 
demonstrates how taxpayers and their counsel, by skillfully navigating 
the sometimes Byzantine procedural aspects of tax litigation may 
structure their refund requests in such a way that could leave the IRS 
powerless to impose the penalty. Such tactics would make section 6676 
a de facto poor people’s tax, applicable only to those who lacked the 
skill and sophistication to avoid it. That cannot be what Congress 
intended. 
Part V suggests legislative and regulatory changes to section 6676 
that would not only ameliorate the procedural and administrative 
problems, but also satisfy the goals identified by TIGTA and the Joint 
Committee. Those changes seek to balance the government’s need to 
address the problem of bogus refund claims with both taxpayers’ and the 
IRS’s need for clear rules and procedures. Lastly, Part VI offers a 
conclusion, as well as a hope for a more effective law. 
II. TAX PENALTIES, REFUNDS AND TAX SHELTERS 
For the most part, taxpayers are rational. They will not engage in 
behaviors, such as cheating on their taxes, if the expected costs of those 
actions outweigh the benefits.20 One item on the cost side of that cost-
benefit calculation is tax penalties, which increase the cost of cheating.21 
 
 20. See Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms: The Case of Tax Compliance, 86 VA. L. REV. 
1781, 1783 (2000): 
A simple approach to the problem of tax compliance holds that when people decide whether to pay 
their taxes, they take account only of the cost of the tax and of the expected legal sanction from 
noncompliance. If the expected sanction exceeds the tax payment, the person will pay; otherwise, he 
will not. 
 21. Yoram Keinan, Playing the Audit Lottery: The Role of Penalties in the U.S. Tax Law in 
the Aftermath of Long Term Capital Holdings v. United States, 3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 381, 395 
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According to the IRS Internal Revenue Manual (the “IRM”), 
“[P]enalties exist to encourage voluntary compliance by supporting the 
standards of behavior required by the Internal Revenue Code.”22 
Although often spun using the positive terminology of encouraging 
voluntary compliance, the reality is that penalties serve as a deterrent to 
intentional non-compliance. The deterrent effect is particularly necessary 
in the tax context, because the chance of the IRS detecting non-
compliance is relatively small. In 2010, for example, the overall 
probability of audit for individual taxpayers was just over 1%.23 Absent 
a penalty, there would be no rational (as opposed to a moral or ethical) 
reason for a taxpayer to comply with tax laws, because the taxpayer 
would have a 99% chance of his non-compliance going undetected.24 
A. Refund Schemes 
Based on the 2007 Joint Committee report, the focus of section 
6676 was bogus refund schemes, i.e., individuals filing fraudulent tax 
returns to claim an undeserved refund. For purposes of this Article, 
individuals seeking fraudulent refunds will be called “Fraudsters.” 
Section 6676 was amended in 2010 to include transactions lacking 
economic substance. That amendment was part of broader legislation 
ostensibly aimed at discouraging tax shelters and other tax avoidance 
transactions by high net worth individuals and corporations. As 
amended, section 6676 imposed a penalty on those seeking tax refunds 
by gaming the tax system with sophisticated tax shelters and other tax 
avoidance transactions. For purposes of this Article, those seeking to 
game the tax system through sophisticated tax avoidance transactions 
will be called “Gamers.” 
Between the Fraudsters and the Gamers are the vast majority of 
 
(2006) (“in the absence of penalties or when the probability of penalties is much less than unity, 
taxpayers who are not risk-averse will be expected to enter into tax-motivated transactions”). 
 22. IRM 20.1.1.2.1(5) (Aug. 5, 2014). See also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-
09-567, IRS SHOULD EVALUATE PENALTIES AND DEVELOP A PLAN TO FOCUS ITS EFFORTS 3 (2009) 
(noting that, “in order to advance the fairness and effectiveness of the tax system, penalties should 
be severe enough to deter noncompliance, encourage noncompliant taxpayers to comply, be 
objectively proportioned to the offense, and be used to educate taxpayers and encourage their future 
compliance”). 
 23. See IRS, DATA BOOK, 2010, at 22 (2010), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
soi/10databk.pdf (providing that as of 2010, the chance of audit for all individual taxpayers was 
about 1.1%). 
 24. For a more detailed analysis of taxpayers’ cost-benefit analysis, see Del Wright Jr., 
Financial Alchemy: How Tax Shelter Promoters Use Financial Products to Bedevil the IRS (And 
How the IRS Helps Them), 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 611, 654-59 (2013). 
7
Wright: Bugus Refunds & Bad Penalties
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2015
3 - WRIGHT P547 MACRO (DO NOT DELETE) 10/21/2015  11:57 AM 
554 AKRON LAW REVIEW [48:547 
taxpayers who improperly seek tax refunds based on a mistake of law or 
fact. This group of taxpayers generally cannot afford tax lawyers to help 
them navigate the sometimes difficult provisions of the Code. For 
purposes of this Article, this group will use the sobriquet “99 
Percenters.” 
One subgroup of the 99 Percenters is particularly relevant for 
purposes of this article: those seeking tax refunds based on refundable 
tax credits. A refundable tax credit (a “refundable credit”) is a tax credit 
that the IRS treats as a cash-equivalent payment. Thus, if the amount of 
a refundable credit exceeds a taxpayer’s tax liability, the government 
will pay the excess to the taxpayer as a refund. Refundable credits are 
unlike the majority of tax credits, which are nonrefundable. Those 
nonrefundable credits may reduce a taxpayer’s federal income tax 
liability to zero, but any excess credits are not refunded to the taxpayer. 
“Most refundable tax credits were created to meet social policy 
goals, such as providing income support for low-income households, 
expanding health insurance coverage, or increasing college 
enrollment.”25 For the most part, they were enacted to assist working 
people in the low-to-middle income ranges, and phase out at upper 
incomes. For the purposes of this Article, taxpayers eligible to claim 
refundable credits are referred to as “Strivers.” Though designed for 
Fraudsters and Gamers, section 6676 applies effectively only to Strivers. 
1. Fraudster Refund Schemes 
“Although the government can be slow to build roads and fix budgets, 
it can issue tax [refunds] within days”26 
In 2013, CNN reported that tax refund fraud has “ballooned” in 
recent years, increasing over 400% from $166 million in 2007 to $758 
million in 2010 (the latest year available at the time).27 TIGTA estimates 
 
 25. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, REFUNDABLE TAX CREDITS 2 (2013), available at 
https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/43767_RefundableTaxCredits_2012_0.pdf. Recent 
refundable credits include the Earned Income Credit, the Excess Social Security Credit, the 
Additional Child Tax Credit, the Health Coverage Tax Credit, and the American Opportunity Credit 
(which is only partly refundable). 
 26. See David Wolman, Beware of Gangsters Filing Tax Returns, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-01-09/tax-refund-fraud-
fake-returns-net-gangsters-millions. The article noted incorrectly that the government can issue tax 
“returns,” not “refunds.” 
 27. See Blake Ellis, Prisoners Rake in Millions from Tax Fraud, CNN MONEY (Jan. 30, 
2013), http://money.cnn.com/2013/01/17/pf/taxes/prisoner-tax-fraud/. This problem is not just a 
recent one. In its 2005 report to Congress, TIGTA noted that “refund fraud committed by prisoners 
is growing at an alarming rate. The number of false returns from prisoners identified by the IRS 
8
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refund fraud has since grown to $2.3 billion in 2011, and forecasts, as of 
December 2013, “approximately $11.4 billion in fraudulent refunds over 
the next five years.”28 
One reason refund fraud has proliferated is the ease with which 
savvy criminals (Fraudsters) can file a false tax return and request a 
bogus refund. For the most part, all Fraudsters need to make bogus 
refund requests are “real Social Security numbers, dates of birth, bank 
account information, addresses, and an Internet connection.”29 The ease 
of using the tax system to steal from the government has not been lost on 
criminal syndicates. According to Businessweek, “[O]rganized crime has 
learned that stealing from the federal government [through tax fraud] can 
be easier and more lucrative than dealing drugs.”30 
“But he that filches from me my good name, Robs me of that which not 
enriches him, And makes me poor indeed.” 
— Shakespeare, Othello, act iii. Sc. 3. 
Unsurprisingly, many Fraudster refund schemes are linked to 
identity theft.31 According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
 
grew” from 4,300 returns to over 18,000 returns in a two-year period, and the IRS only screened 
about “36,000 of the 455,000 prisoner refund returns.” 2005 TIGTA REPORT, supra note 3, at 15. 
Since that report, the number of fraudulent prisoner tax returns has again more than doubled from 
the over 18,000 identified in the 2005 TIGTA Report to approximately 50,000 identified by the IRS 
in 2009. See Press Release, Treasury Inspector Gen. for Tax Admin., IRS Efforts to Identify 
Prisoner Tax Refund Fraud: Significant Problems Persist, TIGTA Finds, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY 
(Jan. 4, 2011), http://www.treasury.gov/tigta/press/press_tigta-2011-1.htm. Fraudulent refunds 
claimed rose from $68.1 million to $295.1 million during the same period. The IRS’s number likely 
understates the problem. The 2009 TIGTA Report noted that the IRS data was limited to only those 
tax returns the IRS identified and chose to evaluate for fraud. TIGTA identified 540,984 tax returns 
that were filed by prisoners in 2009, of which 54,410 were not identified by the IRS as having been 
filed by a prisoner. See TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS 
STILL EXIST WITH INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE EFFORTS TO IDENTIFY PRISONER TAX REFUND 
FRAUD (2010), available at http://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2011reports/
201140009fr.pdf. 
 28. TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., STOLEN AND FALSELY OBTAINED 
EMPLOYER IDENTIFICATION NUMBERS ARE USED TO REPORT FALSE INCOME AND WITHHOLDING 
(2013), available at http://www.treasury.gov/tigta/auditreports/2013reports/201340120fr.pdf. 
 29. Wolman, supra note 26. 
 30. Id. 
 31. “Identity theft,” as defined by the IRS, is: 
the use of another person’s identifying information stolen from a wide variety of places and through 
a wide variety of means. With respect to the IRS, identity theft manifests itself in several ways. 
First, it is used to defraud the government of funds through the filing of fraudulent refund claims. 
Second, in many instances it victimizes an innocent taxpayer by impeding his or her ability to get a 
refund from us. Fraudulent filings may also cause us to initiate an adverse enforcement action 
against the innocent taxpayer. 
See Hearing on Identity Theft and Return Preparer Fraud Before the Subcomm. on Crime, 
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(“FBI”), “this type of crime is perceived by criminals and organized 
criminal enterprises as relatively easy, seemingly low-risk, and, 
ultimately, pure profit which can be used to fund other criminal 
activities . . . like drug trafficking, money laundering, public corruption, 
or even terrorism.”32 
From 2008 through May 2012, more than 550,000 taxpayers have 
had their identities stolen for the purpose of claiming bogus refunds.33 
From 2011 through November 2013, the IRS believes its efforts have 
prevented the issuance of over $50 billion in bogus refunds based on 
identity theft.34 
While clearly illegal, Fraudster refund schemes are exceedingly 
difficult to detect and prosecute. The IRS has hundreds of millions of 
returns to process and must maintain a delicate balance: to minimize 
fraud and abuse but, at the same time, not unduly delay tax refunds.35 
A significant factor in the proliferation of Fraudster refund schemes 
was that, before the enactment of section 6676, there was almost no 
sanction to filing a bogus request.36 As noted in the 2007 Joint 
 
Terrorism and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary 1 (June 28, 2012) (written 
testimony of Rebecca Sparkman, Dir., Operations, Policy & Support Criminal Investigation Div., 
IRS), available at 
http://judiciary.house.gov/_files/hearings/Hearings%202012/Sparkman%2006282012.pdf 
[hereinafter Sparkman Testimony]. 
 32. See Investigating Tax Refund Fraud, FBI Works Cooperatively with Federal Partners, 
FBI STORIES (Mar. 18, 2014), http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2014/march/investigating-tax-
refund-fraud/investigating-tax-refund-fraud. 
 33. See Sparkman Testimony, supra note 31, at 3. See also Press Release, Office of Public 
Affairs, Justice Department Highlights Efforts to Combat Stolen Identity Tax Refund Fraud, U.S. 
DEP’T JUST. (Feb. 24, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2014/February/14-tax-193.html. 
 34. See IRS Newsroom, IRS Combats Identity Theft and Refund Fraud on Many Fronts, IRS 
(Jan. 2014), http://www.irs.gov/uac/Newsroom/IRS-Combats-Identity-Theft-and-Refund-Fraud-on-
Many-Fronts-2014. 
 35. See Sparkman Testimony, supra note 31, at 2: 
We cannot manually inspect 100 million refunds to ensure all are correct – nor is there 
any justification for doing so. That is neither practical nor in keeping with Congressional 
intent. The IRS has a dual mission when it comes to refunds, particularly when they are 
generated in whole or in part by tax credits. Refundable and other tax credits are 
provided to achieve important policy goals, such as relieving poverty, encouraging work, 
or boosting the economy. The IRS must deliver refunds in the intended time frame, 
while ensuring that appropriate controls are in place to minimize errors and fraud. We 
must balance the need to make payments in a timely manner with the need to ensure that 
claims are proper and taxpayer rights are protected. 
 36. Although fraudulent refund claims clearly warranted sanction, the available remedies 
were somewhat limited. Criminal charges were, as they are now, certainly an option, but the scope 
of the problem, as well as the relatively small amounts at issue, could overwhelm the U.S. 
Department of Justice. For the 2013 fiscal year, the IRS initiated 1,492 identity theft-related 
criminal investigations leading to criminal charges in 1,050 cases. See IRS Newsroom, IRS 
Criminal Investigation Combats Identity Theft Refund Fraud, IRS (Jan. 2014), http://www.irs.gov/
10
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Committee Report, existing (pre-section 6676) penalties generally were 
based on tax underpayments, not on whether taxpayers made a claim for 
refund.37 Thus, even when the IRS detected that a claim was bogus, the 
taxpayer’s costs were generally “limited to repayment of the refund plus 
interest for the period of time such funds were held.”38 
One Fraudsters scheme that was mentioned in the lead-up to section 
6676’s enactment was the aptly titled 1099-OID tax fraud scheme. The 
scheme is relatively simple: so-called taxpayers39 would create fictitious 
Forms 1099-OID (forms used legitimately to report accruing interest for 
certain types of debt instruments) claiming that taxes had been withheld 
based on the original issue discount (“OID”) that had been included in 
their gross income. Those “taxpayers” would then submit fraudulent 
returns claiming refunds based on the tax purportedly withheld.40 To 
provide a sense of the breadth of the problem with just the 1099-OID tax 
fraud scheme, in one 2012 prosecution, three defendants pleaded guilty 
to a nationwide scheme claiming “nearly $100 million in fraudulent 
refunds from the IRS.”41 
Another “popular” Fraudster refund scheme is committed by those 
in prison. According to TIGTA, “fraudulent tax returns filed by 
prisoners and identified by the IRS [have] increased from more than 
18,000 tax returns in 2004 to more than 168,000 tax returns in 2010, 
with the refunds claimed on these returns increasing from $68 million to 
$757 million.”42 In testimony to Congress, TIGTA estimated that bogus 
 
uac/Newsroom/IRS-Criminal-Investigation-Combats-Identity-Theft-Refund-Fraud. While 
significant, according to TIGTA, “billions of dollars in potentially fraudulent tax refunds continue 
to be issued without detection.” See TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., DETECTION HAS 
IMPROVED; HOWEVER, IDENTITY THEFT CONTINUES TO RESULT IN BILLIONS OF DOLLARS IN 
POTENTIALLY FRAUDULENT TAX REFUNDS (2013), available at http://www.treasury.gov/
tigta/auditreports/2013reports/201340122fr.pdf. 
 37. See 2007 JCT REPORT, supra note 4, at 186 (“Generally, existing penalties are calculated 
on the existence of a tax underpayment and not on whether claim results in a refund.”). 
 38. Id. 
 39. The word “taxpayers” is a bit of a stretch in this context. 
 40. See United States v. Sundberg, No. C-09-4085 EMC, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93653, at 
*3-4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2011). Under a typical Form 1099-OID refund scheme, . . . a taxpayer 
claims to have either issued or purchased a debt instrument that generated OID interest income. The 
taxpayer further claims that federal income taxes were withheld by the borrower for the full amount 
of the OID interest income purportedly earned by the taxpayer. The taxpayer then reports the total 
amount of the false withholding (and sometimes the false OID interest income) on their income tax 
return, resulting in a large (and completely unsubstantiated) refund. Id. 
 41. See Press Release, U.S. Att’ys Office, W. Dist. Mo., Georgia Woman Pleads Guilty to 
Tax Fraud: Nearly $100 Million Scheme Is Largest False Claims Case Ever Prosecuted in MO, 
U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Apr. 10, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/archive/usao/mow/news2012/
wilson_jennifer.ple.html. 
 42. Press Release, Treasury Inspector Gen. for Tax Admin., More Improvements Needed to 
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refund claims rose the following year (2011) to $3.7 billion.43 
In an effort to slow the growth of prisoner refund fraud, Congress 
passed The Inmate Tax Fraud Prevention Act of 2008 (the “Inmate Tax 
Fraud Prevention Act”), which gave the IRS the authority to disclose 
information concerning prisoners who filed a false tax return to the head 
of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, as well as state departments of 
corrections.44 The law also requires TIGTA to provide Congress with a 
report on the IRS’s progress in sharing prisoner tax information. As of 
October 2010, TIGTA found that the IRS had not shared any such 
information.45 As recently as January 2014, the situation has not 
changed.46 
One impetus for passing section 6676 was to address prison refund 
fraud.47 I leave for others to deduce the logic and efficacy of seeking to 
impose a tax penalty on prison refund schemes. Not to put too fine a 
point on it, but those already incarcerated are not likely to be dissuaded 
from engaging in fraudulent refund schemes based on a potential 20% 
penalty.48 
As noted above, refund schemes based on identity theft constitute a 
significant portion of Fraudster refund schemes. In 2012, TIGTA 
estimated that “the IRS could issue approximately $21 billion in 
fraudulent tax refunds resulting from identity theft over the next five 
years.”49 In response, the IRS listed identity theft at the top of its “‘Dirty 
 
Stop Prisoner Tax Fraud, TIGTA Finds, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY (Jan. 17, 2012), 
http://www.treasury.gov/tigta/press/press_tigta-2013-02.htm. 
 43. See Oversight Hearing – Internal Revenue Service: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. 
Serv. & Gen. Gov’t of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 113th Cong. 23 (2014) (testimony of the 
Hon. J. Russell George, TIGTA), available at http://www.treasury.gov/tigta/congress/
congress_02262014.pdf [hereinafter J. Russell George Testimony] (“The IRS informed us that the 
number of fraudulent tax returns identified by the IRS as filed using a prisoner SSN has increased 
from more than 18,000 tax returns in CY 2004 to more than 186,000 tax returns in CY 2011. The 
refunds claimed on these tax returns increased from $68 million to $3.7 billion.”). 
 44. Inmate Tax Fraud Prevention Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-428, 122 Stat. 4839. 
 45. See J. Russell George Testimony, supra note 43, at 23-24. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Prison refund schemes were one of the two “certain refund schemes [that] have 
overwhelmed IRS resources” identified in the 2005 TIGTA Report, which was cited as basis for 
passing section 6676. See 2007 JCT REPORT, supra note 4, at 186 (citing 2005 TIGTA REPORT, 
supra note 3). 
 48. See To Examine Tax Fraud Committed by Prison Inmates: Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on Oversight of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 109th Cong. 15 (2005) (statement of Rep. Tom 
Feeney) (noting that “prisoners often engage in this form of criminal activity without concern for 
the consequences because they are already incarcerated”). 
 49. Treasury Inspector Gen. for Tax Admin., There Are Billions of Dollars in Undetected Tax 
Refund Fraud Resulting From Identity Theft 3 (2012), available at http://www.treasury.gov/
tigta/auditreports/2012reports/201242080fr.pdf. 
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Dozen’ Tax Scams for 2014”50 and declared, “[S]topping identity theft 
and refund fraud is a top priority.”51 
For reasons that are patent, however, section 6676 will have no 
deterrent effect on identity theft schemes. First, the person making the 
claim is not the taxpayer, making enforcement problematic. Moreover, if 
identity theft is conducted by a criminal enterprise, it would be difficult 
to determine who, exactly, should be liable for the penalty. Second, 
identity theft is already subject to numerous criminal sanctions.52 A 
potential 20% penalty likely adds little deterrence. Lastly, because much 
identity theft originates from abroad,53 the IRS would have little 
opportunity to collect the penalty even if it identified the foreign 
perpetrators. 
2. Gamers Refund Schemes 
In addition to Fraudster refund schemes, the government must also 
combat tax avoidance transactions seeking to exploit the tax code, i.e., 
tax shelters.54 The reason is simple: tax shelters for businesses and high 
 
 50. IRS Newsroom, IRS Releases the “Dirty Dozen” Tax Scams for 2014; Identity Theft, 
Phone Scams Lead List, IRS (Feb. 19, 2014), http://www.irs.gov/uac/Newsroom/IRS-Releases-the-
%E2%80%9CDirty-Dozen%E2%80%9D-Tax-Scams-for-2014;-Identity-Theft,-Phone-Scams-Lead-
List. 
 51. See IRS Newsroom, IRS Combats Identity Theft and Refund Fraud on Many Fronts, IRS 
(Mar. 2013), http://www.irs.gov/uac/Newsroom/IRS-Combats-Identity-Theft-and-Refund-Fraud-
on-Many-Fronts. 
 52. Identity theft is often prosecuted under 18 U.S.C.§ 1028(a)(7) (2012), which makes it a 
crime to “knowingly transfer[], possess[] or use[], without lawful authority, a means of 
identification of another person with the intent to commit, or to aid or abet, or in connection with, 
any unlawful activity that constitutes a violation of Federal law, or that constitutes a felony under 
any applicable State or local law.” This offense, in most circumstances, carries a maximum term of 
fifteen years’ imprisonment, a fine, and criminal forfeiture of any personal property used or 
intended to be used to commit the offense. Identity theft also may involve violations of other 
statutes, such as identification fraud (§ 1028), credit card fraud (§ 1029), computer fraud (§ 1030), 
mail fraud (§ 1341), wire fraud (§ 1343), or financial institution fraud (§ 1344). All these statutes 
are felonies carrying substantial penalties, in some circumstances as high as thirty years’ 
imprisonment, fines, and criminal forfeiture. 
 53. See Gregory Korte, Worldwide Identity Thieves Steal Millions in Tax Refunds, USA 
TODAY (Nov. 8, 2013, 9:12 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2013/11/07/identity-
theft-tax-fraud-lithuania/3466663/. 
 54. The tax shelters described in this Article are “technical” tax shelters, described by former 
Treasury Assistant Secretary Eric Solomon as “tax-engineered transaction[s] normally with little 
business purpose except to save taxes with minimal risk or profit potential often designed to create 
[a] tax loss without an economic loss or in some cases to make income nontaxable.” See Eric 
Solomon, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Address at the Tax Policy Center-Tax Analysts Forum on Tax 
Shelters 11 (Feb. 11, 2005) (transcript on file with author); see also Wright, supra note 24, at 614-
15. 
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net worth individuals have cost the U.S. Treasury billions annually.55 
In what some argue was an effort to stem the tide of tax shelters, 
Congress in 2010 enacted section 7701(o), codifying the long-standing 
economic substance doctrine (“ES Codification”).56 ES Codification 
gave the IRS statutory authority to deny the tax benefits of a transaction 
unless “the transaction changes in a meaningful way (apart from Federal 
income tax effects) the taxpayer’s economic position, and . . . the 
taxpayer has a substantial purpose (apart from Federal income tax 
effects) for entering into such transaction.”57 
Economic substance is one of five common law doctrines that can 
be applied to deny the tax benefits of a tax shelter (or any other tax-
motivated transaction), notwithstanding the fact that the transaction may 
have satisfied the literal requirements of specific tax provisions.58 Before 
ES Codification, none of those common law doctrines appeared in the 
Code. Instead, empowered with the discretion to determine whether a 
transaction’s tax benefits should be denied despite its arguable 
adherence to the Code, courts developed the doctrines over the years.59 
Though beyond the scope of this Article, it is universally acknowledged 
 
 55. See TAX DIVISION: U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, FY 2013 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET 8, available 
at http://www.justice.gov/jmd/2013justification/pdf/fy13-tax-justification.pdf. See also Wright, 
supra note 24, at 613. 
 56. Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 1409(a), 
124 Stat. 1029, 1067. Others have argued that it was a way to manipulate the budget. ES 
Codification was scored to raise $4.5 billion, and supporters of bills that included ES Codification 
were “looking for revenue wherever it might be found.” See Erik M. Jensen, Legislative and 
Regulatory Responses to Tax Avoidance: Explicating and Evaluating the Alternatives, 57 ST. LOUIS 
U. L.J. 1, 22 (2012). See also Jeremy Coder, The Journey to Codify Economic Substance Is Over, 
but Will It Be Worth It?, 127 TAX NOTES 16 (2010) (noting that “many in the tax community have 
suspected that codification was pushed in part because of its revenue-raising ability”). 
 57. I.R.C. § 7701(o)(5)(A) (2012). That definition of economic substance evolved from a long 
line of federal tax cases, including Coltec Indus., Inc. v. United States, 454 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 
2006), vacating and remanding 62 Fed. Cl. 716 (2004); ACM P’ship v. Comm’r, 157 F.3d 231 (3d 
Cir. 1998), aff’g 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 189 (1997); and Klamath Strategic Inv. Fund, LLC v. United 
States, 472 F. Supp. 2d 885 (E.D. Texas 2007), aff’d 568 F.3d 537 (5th Cir. 2009). On at least three 
occasions, the U.S. Tax Court has noted that section 7701(o) represents Congress’ adoption of the 
economic substance as articulated by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in the case of 
ACM Partnership. See, e.g., Crispin v. Comm’r, 103 T.C.M. (CCH) 1349, at *16 n.14 (2012); Blum 
v. Comm’r, 103 T.C.M. (CCH) 1099, at *17 n.21 (2012); Rovakat, LLC v. Comm’r, 102 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 264, at *27 n.11 (2011). 
 58. The others are substance over form, step transaction, sham transaction, and business 
purpose. See Yoram Keinan, The Economic Substance Doctrine, 508 Tax Mgmt. Port. (BNA) A-58 
(2007) for a thorough discussion of the doctrines. See also Patricia Lampreave, An Assessment of 
Anti-Tax Avoidance Doctrines in the United States and the European Union, BULL. INT’L TAX’N, 
Mar. 2012, at 153. 
 59. See Lawrence Zelenak, Controlling Corporate Tax Shelters, 44 S.M.U. L. REV. 177, 183 
(2001). 
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that substantial overlap existed, and still exists, among the doctrines, and 
the lines between one doctrine and others are often blurred.60 
ES Codification gave the IRS additional weapons to combat 
shelters: new strict liability penalties for transactions lacking economic 
substance.61 One such penalty was a new 20% (increased to 40% under 
certain circumstances)62 strict liability penalty for any “transaction 
lacking economic substance . . . or failing to meet the requirements of 
any similar rule of law.”63 In addition to the new penalty, Congress also 
made taxpayers strictly liable for penalties related to transactions lacking 
economic substance by eliminating the reasonable cause defense.64 The 
new strict liability penalty was intended to change the calculus for 
Gamers by making the potential cost of engaging in tax avoidance 
transactions greater.65 
One issue left unresolved in ES Codification was in what 
circumstances the codified economic substance, as opposed to one or 
more of the other four common law doctrines, would apply.66 Even if it 
 
 60. The overlap among the doctrines is beyond the scope of this Article. However, examples 
can be found in certain substance-over-form cases in which courts have examined (i) whether the 
substance of the transaction comported with its form, (ii) whether the transaction had economic 
substance, and (iii) whether the transaction had a legitimate business purpose. See STAFF OF J. 
COMM. ON TAXATION, 111TH CONG., DESCRIPTION OF REVENUE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE 
PRESIDENT’S FISCAL YEAR 2010 BUDGET PROPOSAL: PART THREE 98 n.300 (Comm. Print 2009) 
[hereinafter 2009 TECHNICAL EXPLANATION]; BB&T Corp. v. United States, 1 U.S. Tax Cas. 
(CCH) P50,130 (M.D.N.C. 2007), aff’d 523 F.3d 461 (4th Cir. 2008). Although the Second Circuit 
found for the government in TIFD III–E, Inc. v. United States, on remand to consider issues under 
section 704(e), the district court found for the taxpayer. See TIFD III–E Inc. v. United States, 660 F. 
Supp. 2d 367 (D. Conn. 2009). See also Yoram Keinan, Rethinking The Role of the Judicial Step 
Transaction Principle and a Proposal For Codification, 22 AKRON TAX J. 45 (2007). 
 61. See I.R.C. § 6662(b)(6), which applies the accuracy-related penalty of section 6662 to the 
portion of any underpayments attributable to a transaction lacking economic substance. Congress 
also (1) amended section 6664(c), eliminating the reasonable cause exception for underpayments to 
any portion of any underpayment attributable to a section 6662(b)(6) transaction; and (2) amended 
section 6664(d) so that the reasonable cause exception found in section 6664(d)(1) shall not apply to 
any reportable transaction understatement (within the meaning of section 6662A(b)) attributable to a 
section 6662(b)(6) transaction. Id. § 6664(c)-(d). 
 62. See id. § 6662(h)-(i). 
 63. Id. § 6662(b)(6). 
 64. See supra note 61. 
 65. While that may have been the intent, I have argued that codification had little actual effect 
on changing Gamers’ behavior, because even with the added costs, the benefits will outweigh the 
costs for most taxpayers. See Wright, supra note 24, at 654. 
 66. No official legislative history exists for section 7701(o). However, the 2009 Technical 
Explanation was introduced contemporaneously with the introduction of the law. Although not 
considered formal “legislative history,” it does provide insight into section 7701(o). A detailed 
review of the economic substance doctrine and the proposals to codify it are found in 2009 
TECHNICAL EXPLANATION: PART TWO, supra note 60, at 34-71 and STAFF OF J. COMM. ON 
TAXATION, 111TH CONG., TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE 
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is clear that a tax avoidance transaction’s tax benefits should be denied, 
substantial uncertainty exists regarding whether the reason for denial is a 
lack of economic substance (which generates harsher penalties) or one of 
the other four common law doctrines.67 Some commentators have noted 
that by failing to provide rules for when the economic substance doctrine 
would apply, Congress left a gap that prevented the IRS from using ES 
Codification to aggressively combat all but the most egregious tax 
shelters.68 
As part of ES Codification, Congress also added section 6676(c), 
extending the 20% strict liability penalty to refund claims based on 
transactions lacking economic substance.69 Congress also eliminated the 
reasonable basis defense to the section 6676 penalty for transactions 
determined to be devoid of economic substance.70 
It is unclear why Congress added an economic substance penalty to 
section 6676. In the 2010 Joint Committee Technical Explanation, 
fifteen pages are devoted to explaining ES Codification, but the only 
detail about the section 6676(c) penalty is the following sentence: 
Similarly, a claim for refund or credit that is excessive under section 
6676 due to a claim that is lacking in economic substance or failing to 
meet the requirements of any similar rule of law is subject to the 20 
percent penalty under that section, and the reasonable basis exception 
is not available.71 
A Lexis search of the terms “economic substance” and “6676” 
returned no cases in which the IRS has asserted the penalty.72 No other 
 
“RECONCILIATION ACT OF 2010,” AS AMENDED, IN COMBINATION WITH THE “PATIENT 
PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT” 142-56 (Comm. Print 2010) [hereinafter 2010 
TECHNICAL EXPLANATION]. 
 67. That uncertainty gives the IRS wide discretion to apply one or more of those judicial 
doctrines to a certain transaction. The IRS has chosen to exercise that discretion cautiously and has 
provided that, “until further guidance is issued, the related penalty provisions are limited to the 
application of the economic substance doctrine and may not be imposed due to the application of 
any other ‘similar rule of law’ or judicial doctrine, e.g., step transaction doctrine, substance over 
form, or sham transaction.” See I.R.S. Chief Couns. Notice CC-2012-008 (Apr. 3, 2012). 
 68. Bryan C. Skarlatos, Penalties: Unintended Consequences of the Economic Substance 
Penalty, J. TAX PRAC. & PROC., Oct.-Nov. 2012, at 21, 21, available at 
http://kflaw.com/siteFiles/News/39E7E7D53F3FEF97D5B42E3EB3A9B034.pdf; Carol P. Tello, 
Dealing with Codified Economic Substance in the Context of International Issues: Self Help, the 
Only Game in Town, TAX EXECUTIVES INST., Spring 2011, at 43, 44, available at 
http://www.tei.org/news/articles/Pages/TTE_SPRING11_dealing_with_codified_economic_substan
ce_in_the_context_of_international_issues.aspx. 
 69. See I.R.C. § 6676(c) (2012). 
 70. See id. 
 71. See 2010 TECHNICAL EXPLANATION, supra note 66, at 156.  
 72. The only case where the terms are mentioned together, TIFD III-E Inc. v. United States, 
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information suggests the IRS has levied the penalty in other 
circumstances.73 
The likely reason there is no evidence of the IRS’s use of the 
economic substance penalty under section 6676(c) is that Gamers enter 
into tax shelters and other tax avoidance transactions not to generate 
false refunds, but to avoid paying taxes.74 As was the case with prisoner 
refund schemes, the deterrent effect of section 6676(c) on Gamers is 
dubious at best. 
B. Erroneous Refunds – The Strivers 
“My power is discombobulatingly devastating . . . It’s ludicrous these 
mortals even attempt to enter my realm.” 
–Mike Tyson75 
If we eliminate the refund schemes of Fraudsters and Gamers, the 
only thing left covered by section 6676 is the erroneous refunds based on 
mistakes of law or fact, or aggressive, but not fraudulent, return 
positions. That means the Strivers (other than those improperly claiming 
the EITC, which is exempt from section 6676),76 are the only group that 
will bear the brunt of the section 6676 penalty, because, as explained 
above, the penalty cannot reach most Fraudsters and Gamers. However, 
unlike almost every other tax penalty, section 6676 contains no 
reasonable cause defense; therefore, the Strivers have only a limited 
ability to escape the penalty. In other words, the penalty that Congress 
enacted to cover Fraudsters and Gamers covers neither group well, but 
did have the effect of creating a new, hard-to-escape penalty for Strivers 
– the very group it would like to help. As Iron Mike Tyson would say 
 
refers to section 6676 only to evaluate the IRS’s position on the reasonable basis standard, as 
articulated by an IRS Chief Counsel Memorandum that looked to section 6662 for guidance in 
determining reasonable basis. See TIFD III-E Inc. v. United States, 8 F. Supp. 3d 142 (D. Conn. 
2014). 
 73. In an admittedly ad hoc effort to determine whether the IRS sought to enforce any such 
penalties, I reached out to attorneys at my old firms, Skadden Arps and Steptoe. None mentioned 
being aware of any attempt by the IRS to impose the section 6676(c) penalty. 
 74. See Kyle D. Logue & Gustavo G. Vettori, Narrowing the Tax Gap Through Presumptive 
Taxation, 2 COLUM. J. TAX L. 100, 103 (2010) (“Tax shelters are extraordinarily complex and 
highly aggressive (though usually not patently illegal) transactions designed entirely for the purpose 
of reducing, and in some cases eliminating, the tax liabilities of large corporate or wealthy 
individual taxpayers.”). 
 75. See Brian Opal, Mike Tyson: Top 25 Quotes, FIGHT SAGA (Nov. 27, 2014, 1:13 PM), 
http://www.fightsaga.com/news/item/4980-Mike-Tyson-Top-25-quotes. 
 76. Section 6676 specifically exempts taxpayers erroneously claiming the EITC from the 
penalty. See I.R.C. § 6676(a) (2012). 
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(and has said, see above quote), this is “ludicrous.” 
Before delving into the myriad legal and administrative problems 
associated with section 6676, an overview of the existing penalty 
structure, as well as how section 6676 fits into that structure, is 
necessary to put the issues in context. For readers already familiar with 
the current tax penalty structure, as well as the available defenses and 
procedures for challenging those penalties, please skim this section and 
move to Part III. 
C. Current Law 
1. Penalties 
Section 6676, as noted above, has no specific legislative history. 
The first legislative attempt to address the problem of erroneous refund 
claims can be found in a 2006 Senate Finance Committee draft, which 
proposed a 20% penalty for erroneous refund claims.77 Although that 
2006 draft was not enacted, Congress eventually passed the erroneous 
refund penalty as part of the 2007 Act. The Joint Committee 
acknowledged that a major impetus for Congress in passing section 6676 
was the 2005 TIGTA Report, noted above, which highlighted the 
problems experienced by the IRS in dealing with erroneous or bogus 
refund claims.78 
The law is relatively short. Section 6676 in its entirety reads: 
(a) Civil penalty. If a claim for refund or credit with respect to income 
tax (other than a claim for a refund or credit relating to the earned 
income credit under section 32) is made for an excessive amount, 
unless it is shown that the claim for such excessive amount has a 
reasonable basis, the person making such claim shall be liable for a 
 
 77. S. COMM. ON FINANCE, TELEPHONE EXCISE TAX REPEAL AND TAXPAYER PROTECTION 
AND ASSISTANCE ACT OF 2006, S. REP. NO. 109-336 (2006). Explaining the provision, the 
Committee noted: 
The filing of erroneous refund claims is being used by some taxpayers to put a strain on 
IRS resources and to delay the resolution of tax matters. The Committee believes a 
meaningful penalty on a refund claim with no reasonable basis for the claimed treatment 
will deter the use of such claims for the purpose of impeding effective tax 
administration. 
Id. at 66. 
 78. See 2007 JCT REPORT, supra note 4 (citing 2005 TIGTA REPORT, supra note 3, at 186); 
see also TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., STATISTICAL PORTRAYAL OF THE CRIMINAL 
INVESTIGATION FUNCTION’S ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES FROM FISCAL YEAR 2000 THROUGH 
FISCAL YEAR 2006 10 (2007) (showing that tax refund fraud increased 36.2% between 2003 and 
2005). 
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penalty in an amount equal to 20 percent of the excessive amount. 
(b) Excessive amount. For purposes of this section, the term “excessive 
amount” means in the case of any person the amount by which the 
amount of the claim for refund or credit for any taxable year exceeds 
the amount of such claim allowable under this title for such taxable 
year. 
(c) Noneconomic substance transactions treated as lacking reasonable 
basis. For purposes of this section, any excessive amount which is 
attributable to any transaction described in section 6662(b)(6) shall not 
be treated as having a reasonable basis. 
(d) Coordination with other penalties. This section shall not apply to 
any portion of the excessive amount of a claim for refund or credit 
which is subject to a penalty imposed under part II of subchapter A of 
chapter 68.79 
Unlike penalty provisions based on a taxpayer’s underpayment of a 
tax liability, section 6676 penalizes mere claims for erroneous refunds or 
credits. The ability to penalize claims specifically was noted by the Joint 
Committee, which found that because existing penalties were based on 
tax underpayments and not the amount of a refund claim, there was 
“very little expected cost to the taxpayer who files an erroneous refund 
claim under present law.”80 
The “existing penalties” referenced by the Joint Committee 
included the section 6662 accuracy-related penalty , enacted in 1989 to 
replace a number of separate penalties.81 That section 6662 penalty 
imposes a 20% penalty on underpayments of tax attributable to, inter 
alia, “negligence or disregard of rules or regulation.”82 In general, the 
accuracy-related penalty can be avoided upon a showing of reasonable 
cause.83 The term “underpayment,” defined in section 6664 and its 
implementing regulations, seeks to capture the difference between the 
 
 79. I.R.C. § 6676(d). 
 80. 2007 JCT REPORT, supra note 4, at 186. 
 81. See Improved Penalty Administrative Compliance Tax Act (“IMPACT”), P.L.101-239, 
tit. VII, subtit. G of Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989. 
 82. I.R.C. § 6662(b)(1). The section 6662 penalty applies to the portion of any underpayment 
that is attributable to (1) negligence, (2) any substantial understatement of income tax, (3) any 
substantial valuation misstatement, (4) any substantial overstatement of pension liabilities, or (5) 
any substantial estate or gift tax valuation understatement. The penalty for underpayments 
attributable to these failures is generally 20% of the underpayment, but in the case of a gross 
valuation misstatement, it is 40%. The section 6662 and 6676 penalties do not overlap, as section 
6676(d) prohibits the IRS from imposing the section 6676 penalty to any portion of a refund claim 
subject to, inter alia, a section 6662 underpayment. 
 83. See id. § 6664(c)(1). 
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tax paid and the tax that should have been paid.84 
Section 6676(c), added in 2010 as part of ES Codification, applies 
to claims for refunds based on transactions lacking economic substance 
or, pursuant to section 7701(o), “failing to meet the requirements of any 
similar rule of law.”85 With respect to the “any similar rule of law” 
clause, the Joint Committee noted that it was intended to apply to “a 
transaction the tax benefits of which are disallowed as a result of the 
application of the similar factors and analysis that is required under the 
provision for an economic substance analysis, even if a different term is 
used to describe the doctrine.”86 The IRS has stated that it will not seek 
to utilize the “any similar rule of law” provision in applying the section 
6676 penalties.87 
2. Penalty Defense 
As a way to protect taxpayers, Congress gave taxpayers the right to 
challenge section 6662 penalties prior to assessment.88 In addition, 
notice and demand for payment (“notice and demand”), often the start of 
the IRS’s collection procedures, in most cases cannot be initiated prior to 
assessment.89 
Generally, before assessing a section 6662 penalty, the IRS must 
first send to the taxpayer a legally valid notice of deficiency, and that 
notice of deficiency is a prerequisite for collection under the IRS’s 
 
 84. See id. § 6664(a), which defines “underpayment” as “the amount by which any tax 
imposed by this title exceeds the excess of— 
(1) the sum of— 
(A) the amount shown as the tax by the taxpayer on his return, plus 
(B) amounts not so shown previously assessed (or collected without assessment), over  
(2) the amount of rebates made. 
 85. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 111TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX 
LEGISLATION ENACTED IN THE 111TH CONGRESS 381 (Comm. Print 2011). Under section 7701(o), a 
transaction is treated as having economic substance only if it passes a conjunctive, two-prong test. 
The test requires that (i) the transaction changes in a meaningful way (apart from federal income tax 
effects) the taxpayer’s economic position, and (ii) the taxpayer has a substantial purpose (apart from 
federal income tax effects) for entering into the transaction. I.R.C. § 7701(o). 
 86. 2010 TECHNICAL EXPLANATION, supra note 66, at 155 n.359. 
 87. I.R.S. Guidance LB&I-4-0711-015 (July 15, 2011), available at http://www.irs.gov/
Businesses/Guidance-for-Examiners-and-Managers-on-the-Codified-Economic-Substance-
Doctrine-and-Related-Penalties. In the Guidance, the IRS stated that the penalties provided in 
section 6676 “are limited to the application of the economic substance doctrine and may not be 
imposed due to the application of any other ‘similar rule of law’ or judicial doctrine (e.g., step 
transaction doctrine, substance over form or sham transaction).” Id. 
 88. “Assessment” is the formal recording of a tax liability by the IRS. See I.R.C. § 6203. 
 89. If collection of the tax is in jeopardy, the IRS is not required to wait ten days after giving 
the taxpayer notice and demand or thirty days after giving notice of intent to levy and notice of a 
right to a CDP hearing. See IRM 5.17.15.4.2 (Oct. 23, 2014). 
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collection procedures.90 Once a taxpayer receives a notice of deficiency, 
the taxpayer can appeal the penalty with the IRS, or, after the IRS issues 
a notice of deficiency, challenge the penalty assessment in the U.S. Tax 
Court (“Tax Court”), the only pre-payment forum for taxpayers seeking 
to challenge an IRS tax or penalty assessment.91 
The procedures for challenging notices of deficiency are outlined in 
sections 6211–6213, and are commonly referred to as deficiency 
procedures (“Deficiency Procedures”).92 Most tax cases are litigated in 
Tax Court, primarily because it permits taxpayers to challenge 
deficiencies prior to payment.93 
Unlike section 6662 penalties, taxpayers have no right to challenge 
section 6676 penalties prior to assessment because section 6676 does not 
permit Deficiency Procedures.94 Pursuant to Section 6671(a), the IRS 
can impose section 6676 penalties by notice and demand, without the 
issuance of a notice of deficiency.95 As such, section 6676 penalties are 
immediately assessable and may be imposed at whatever point the IRS 
deems them applicable. 
As an immediately assessable penalty, a taxpayer has no explicit 
right to challenge the section 6676 penalty assessment before its 
imposition. Whether the IRS will countenance a pre-assessment right to 
challenge the section 6676 penalty, however, is far from clear. Internal 
IRS guidance suggests section “[section] 6676 cases are generally 
subject to pre-assessment and appeal rights procedures.”96 Unfortunately 
for taxpayers, internal IRS guidance is not binding on the IRS and may 
not be relied on by taxpayers.97 
The only legally prescribed methods for taxpayers seeking to 
challenge section 6676 penalties are to either (i) pre-pay the penalty and 
sue for refund in either a U.S. District Court or the Court of Federal 
Claims (“Refund Procedures”),98 or (ii) request a Collection Due Process 
 
 90. See id. 5.17.15.4.1. 
 91. See I.R.C. §§ 6212-6213. 
 92. See id. §§ 6211-6216, found in I.R.C. Chapter 63, Subchapter B–Deficiency Procedures in 
the Case of Income, Estate, Gift, and Certain Excise Taxes. 
 93. See Danshera Cords, Tax Court Appointments and Reappointments: Improving the 
Process, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 501, 533 (Jan. 2012) (“Due to a number of factors, including that the 
taxpayer need not prepay the tax prior to filing a petition in the Tax Court, the majority of tax cases 
are filed in the Tax Court.”). 
 94. I.R.C. § 6676 is located in I.R.C. Chapter 68, Subchapter B–Assessable Penalties. 
 95. See id. § 6671(a). 
 96. See IRM 8.11.1.2.7(4) (Oct. 16, 2014). 
 97. See, e.g., Kristin E. Hickman, Unpacking the Force of Law, 66 VAND. L. REV. 465, 502-
09 (2013). 
 98. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) (2012), district courts and the Court of Federal Claims 
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(“CDP”) hearing after the IRS initiates collection procedures.99 If the 
taxpayer and the IRS cannot resolve the issue in a CDP hearing, the 
taxpayer may seek resolution with the Tax Court, which gives taxpayers 
the ability to challenge not only the IRS’s collection procedures, but also 
the underlying liability (“CDP Procedures”).100 
3. Exceptions to Penalties 
Taxpayers can challenge the imposition of section 6662 penalties if 
they can show they acted with “reasonable cause . . . and . . . in good 
faith” (“reasonable cause”).101 The reasonable cause defense excuses 
from penalties taxpayers who can show an “honest misunderstanding of 
fact or law that is reasonable in light of all of the facts and 
circumstances, including the experience, knowledge, and education of 
the taxpayer.”102 
For reasons that are not entirely clear, taxpayers seeking to 
challenge section 6676 penalties may not raise the reasonable cause 
defense.103 As part of the 2007 JCT Report, the Joint Committee 
contemplated a reasonable cause exception to the then-proposed section 
6676 penalty, noting that the penalty would apply absent a reasonable 
basis or if “the taxpayer did not have reasonable cause.”104 However, the 
reasonable cause defense was excluded from the final bill, leaving only 
the “reasonable basis” exception discussed below, which has an entirely 
different meaning than reasonable cause.105 
Absent a reasonable cause defense, section 6676 applies to 
erroneous refund claims lacking a “reasonable basis in law.”106 Section 
 
have original jurisdiction over: 
Any civil action against the United States for the recovery of any internal-revenue tax 
alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or any penalty 
claimed to have been collected without authority or any sum alleged to have been 
excessive or in any manner wrongfully collected under the internal-revenue laws.  
 99. See I.R.C. § 6330(a)(3)(B). 
 100. Id. § 6330(d)(1). See also Callahan v. Comm’r, 130 T.C. 44 (2008) (holding the Tax 
Court had jurisdiction under section 6330(d) to hear return penalty cases). 
 101. I.R.C. § 6664(c)(1). Section 6664 does not define reasonable cause. However, Treasury 
Regulations provide that “the determination of whether a taxpayer acted with reasonable cause and 
in good faith is made on a case-by-case basis, taking into account all pertinent facts and 
circumstances.” Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(b)(1) (as amended in 2003). See also William A. Drennan, 
Strict Liability and Tax Penalties, 62 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 15 (2009). 
 102.  Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(b)(1). 
 103. Section 6676 permits only the reasonable basis defense. See I.R.C. § 6676(a). 
 104. 2007 JCT REPORT, supra note 4, at 186. 
 105. Work Opportunity Tax Act, supra note 6. 
 106. 2007 JCT REPORT, supra note 4, at 186. 
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6676 does not define the term “reasonable basis,” and, to date, no 
regulations have been issued articulating a definition in the context of 
the section 6676 penalty.107 Nevertheless, the IRS appears to have 
adopted the definition found in Treasury Regulation § 1.6662-3(b)(3), 
which defines the term as follows: 
Reasonable basis is a relatively high standard of tax reporting, that is, 
significantly higher than not frivolous or not patently improper. The 
reasonable basis standard is not satisfied by a return position that is 
merely arguable or that is merely a colorable claim. If a return position 
is reasonably based on one or [more] of the authorities set forth in 
[Treas. Reg.] § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(iii) (taking into account the relevance 
and persuasiveness of the authorities, and subsequent developments), 
the return position will generally satisfy the reasonable basis standard 
even though it may not satisfy the substantial authority standard as 
defined in [Treas. Reg.] § 1.6662-4(d)(2).108 
That reasonable basis definition eliminates penalties only for 
transactions with one or more valid legal, as opposed to factual, 
justifications. Thus, unlike the reasonable cause defense available under 
section 6662, taxpayers cannot rely on good faith legal or factual errors 
to escape section 6676 penalties. 
A question left unanswered is how the IRS will determine whether 
a refund claim has a reasonable basis. Neither Treasury nor the IRS has 
articulated procedures for determining whether a reasonable basis exists 
in the context of the section 6676 penalty.109 In fact, the IRS has issued 
conflicting guidance surrounding the determination of “reasonable 
basis,” leaving taxpayers and practitioners in the dark, and potentially 
exacerbating the First Amendment issues discussed infra. 
In 2013, the IRS appeared to indicate, following a TIGTA inquiry, 
that it will make the reasonable basis determination without taxpayer 
input. Specifically, the IRS asserted that, “the determination of 
reasonable basis is a judgmental decision based on a review of the 
position taken on the return and all applicable supporting authorities for 
the position.”110 That language does not appear to suggest taxpayers will 
 
 107. See I.R.S.Chief Couns. Mem. POSTN-152570-09 (Feb. 26, 2010) (“While section 6676 
does not define ‘reasonable basis’ and there are no regulations in effect under that statute, we look 
to the definition of ‘reasonable basis’ in regulations promulgated under the section 6662 accuracy-
related penalty for guidance.”). 
 108. Id. (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(b)(3) (as amended in 2003)). 
 109. See, e.g., Jeremy Coder, Waiting for Direction on Refund Penalties, TAX NOTES TODAY, 
July 2, 2012, at 127-3. 
 110. 2013 TIGTA REPORT, supra note 9, at 15. 
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be given an opportunity to present arguments for reasonable basis. 
However, conflicting advice to IRS employees is provided in two 
2010 Chief Counsel Memoranda.111 In both, IRS Counsel states that 
taxpayers will be given the opportunity to show reasonable basis. 
Specifically, both memoranda state that the section 6676 penalty will 
apply unless taxpayers “can show” that their claim has a reasonable 
basis.112 Use of the word “can” suggests taxpayers will have an 
opportunity to demonstrate their reasonable basis to the IRS and avoid 
the penalty. 
III. UNMET POTENTIAL 
Before section 6676’s enactment, a taxpayer filing an erroneous 
claim for refund faced three circumstances (ignoring potential criminal 
or fraud allegations):113 
(1)  the IRS denies the claim—no penalty; 
(2)  the IRS wrongly accepts the claim, issues a refund check, but 
timely realizes the error—potential penalty; or 
(3) the IRS wrongly accepts the claim, issues a refund check, and fails 
to timely realize the error—no penalty. 
Only in the second circumstance were penalties potentially 
applicable. In that case, the applicable section 6662 penalty would be 
based on the “underpayment” of tax, defined in section 6664 and its 
implementing regulations to capture the difference between what was 
paid and what should have been paid.114 With respect to the erroneously-
 
 111. See I.R.S. Chief Couns. Mem. POSTN-152570-09 (Feb. 26, 2010) and I.R.S. Chief 
Couns. Mem. POSTN-125498-10 (Aug. 27, 2010). 
 112. See sources cited supra note 111 (emphasis added). 
 113. Criminal tax crimes and tax fraud are exceedingly difficult for the government to prove. 
For tax crimes, the government must demonstrate, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the taxpayer 
acted willfully. See, e.g., Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 193 (1991); United States v. 
Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10, 12 (1976); United States v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346, 358-59 (1973); Sansone 
v. United States, 380 U.S. 343, 351 (1965); Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 124, 139 
(1954). For civil tax fraud, the IRS must demonstrate “clear and convincing evidence to prove that 
some part of the underpayment of tax was due to fraud.” See IRM 25.1.6.1 (Nov. 5, 2014). For an 
interesting look at what does (and does not) constitute fraud, see Brown v. Comm’r, 106 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 630 (2013). 
 114. See I.R.C. § 6664(a) (2012). “Underpayment is defined in I.R.C. § 6664 and the 
implementing regulation expresses the definition of this term by the following formula: 
Underpayment = W - (X + Y - Z), where W= the amount of income tax imposed, X = the amount 
shown as the tax by the taxpayer on his return; Y = the amounts not so shown previously assessed 
(or collected without assessment), and Z = the amount of rebates made. Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-2(a).” 
I.R.S. Chief Couns. Mem. POSTS-119273-12 (May 30, 2012), available at http://www.irs.gov/
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issued refund, the IRS often ignored it in its underpayment calculation, 
and simply required taxpayers to repay the erroneous refund claim with 
interest.115 
Section 6676 gives the IRS the ability to penalize taxpayers in the 
first circumstance, and a greater opportunity to penalize them in the 
second. In both cases, the penalty calculation appears straightforward: 
20% of the erroneous refund claim. However, as discussed infra, 
calculation of that penalty has raised significant definitional issues that 
have thrust the IRS into a procedural nightmare. 
A. Problems Since Enactment 
1. Internal IRS Issues 
In 2008, the IRS completed a study on “how best to implement the 
erroneous refund penalty” and estimated that “establishing and 
maintaining an erroneous refund penalty unit would cost at least $3.4 
million per year and could result in the assessment of $101 million in 
penalties each year.”116 As of 2013, the IRS had taken no steps toward 
implementing its own recommendations.117 
To make matters worse, in 2009 and 2010, the IRS made incorrect 
legal determinations regarding when it could assess the section 6676 
penalty. A memorandum issued by IRS Counsel on November 20, 2009 
(“2009 IRS Counsel Memorandum”) concluded incorrectly that if the 
IRS disallowed refundable tax credits and did not issued a refund based 
on those disallowed credits (a “frozen refund”), the frozen refund 
amount nevertheless should be included in the section 6662 penalty 
calculation.118 In other words, if the IRS denied a taxpayer’s refund 
claim based on refundable credits and froze (i.e., did not issue) a refund, 
the IRS came to the absurd conclusion that it should penalize the 
 
pub/lanoa/pmta_2012-16.pdf. 
 115. See 2007 JCT REPORT, supra note 4, at 186: 
Generally, existing penalties are calculated on the existence of a tax underpayment and 
not on whether claim results in a refund. Even in the case where an erroneous refund 
claim is detected, the taxpayer’s costs may be limited to repayment of the refund plus 
interest for the period of time such funds were held. Thus, there is very little expected 
cost to the taxpayer who files an erroneous refund claim under present law. 
 116. 2013 TIGTA REPORT, supra note 9, at 3. 
 117. See id. 
 118. I.R.S. Chief Couns. Mem. POSTS-128277-09 (Nov. 20, 2009), exs. 1, 2, and 6, available 
at http://www.irs.gov/pub/lanoa/pmta_2010-01.pdf (showing a pre-refund example in which a 
taxpayer’s section 6662 penalty calculation was determined based on an improperly claimed, but 
unpaid, refundable tax credit). 
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taxpayer under section 6662 as if it had actually issued the refund, and 
the frozen refund amount should be included in the section 6662 
underpayment calculation. In a 2010 IRS counsel memorandum (the 
“2010 IRS Counsel Memorandum”), the IRS again made the same 
incorrect determination.119 
Those 2009 and 2010 IRS Counsel Memoranda (the “2009 & 2010 
IRS Memos”) authorized IRS examiners to seek section 6662 penalties 
in the precise situation section 6676 was enacted to address, i.e., 
erroneous claims for refund. Moreover, because section 6676(d) 
prohibits the imposition of section 6676 penalties if “any portion of the 
excessive amount of a claim for refund or credit which is subject to a 
penalty imposed under” inter alia, section 6662, the 2009 & 2010 
Memos prohibited proper application of section 6676.120 
The 2009 & 2010 Memos were flat wrong. The IRS acknowledged 
as much in a May 12, 2012, IRS Counsel Memorandum (the “2012 IRS 
Counsel Memorandum”), which determined correctly that a frozen 
refund could not constitute part the section 6662 underpayment 
calculation.121 
Relying on the 2009 & 2010 Memos prevented the IRS from 
assessing the erroneous refund penalty in numerous cases.122 As a way to 
explain its errors, the IRS placed the blame on unclear Treasury 
Regulations, a startling result for the agency charged with enforcing the 
tax laws and working with Treasury to draft tax regulations.123 
What the IRS did after the 2012 IRS Counsel is more troubling, 
however. After determining the 2009 & 2010 Memos were wrong in 
2012, the IRS blithely continued to impose section 6662 penalties on 
frozen refund claims for roughly ten months.124 Moreover, despite 
 
 119. See I.R.S. Chief Couns. Mem. POSTN-125498-10 (Aug. 27, 2010), ex. 2, available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/lanoa/pmta-2011-003.pdf (including the unpaid refund amount in the 
underpayment calculation). 
 120. See I.R.C. § 6676(d) (2012). 
 121. I.R.S. Chief Couns. Mem. POSTS-119273-12 (May 30, 2012), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/lanoa/pmta_2012-16.pdf. See also 2013 TIGTA REPORT, supra note 9, at 5. 
 122. 2013 TIGTA REPORT, supra note 9, at 5. 
 123. See id. (“The IRS indicated that the incorrect interpretation contained in the November 
2009 memorandum occurred because a Treasury Regulation that provided guidance on this subject 
was not clear.”). 
 124. See 1 TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., 2013 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 184 (2013), 
available at http://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/userfiles/file/2013FullReport/ACCURACY-
RELATED-PENALTIES-The-IRS-Assessed-Penalties-Improperly,-Refused-to-Abate-Them,-and-
Still-Assesses-Penalties-Automatically.pdf (“The IRS continued imposing substantial 
understatement penalties on frozen refund claims for about ten months after receiving the May 30, 
2012 guidance.”). 
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acknowledging it was wrong, the IRS did not give taxpayers hit with the 
improper penalties a break, and “failed to remove over 46,000 penalties 
totaling more than $40 million that it imposed in the two and a half years 
between the issuance of the first [IRS] Counsel opinion (November 20, 
2009) (which [IRS] Counsel has implicitly acknowledged was incorrect) 
and the most recent [IRS] Counsel opinion (May 30, 2012).”125 In a 
stunning rebuke to the IRS on this issue, TIGTA wrote that the “IRS’s 
failure to expend the resources needed to remove these improper and 
inapplicable penalties signals disrespect for the law and a disregard for 
taxpayer rights.”126 
As was the case with the erroneous application of the section 6662 
penalty, the IRS may not be exercising the diligence required with 
respect to section 6676. In 2009, the American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants (AICPA) reported that it had become “aware of 
section 6676 penalties being imposed automatically and regularly when 
a claim for refund is denied, without any consideration of whether the 
position has a reasonable basis.”127 The AICPA suggested that the IRS’s 
actions were possibly “attributable to the fact that to date the IRS has not 
published regulations or other guidance with respect to section 6676.”128 
2. Fresh Gas on the Fire 
As if refund penalties were not complicated enough to administer, 
the Tax Court made the IRS’s job even more difficult in November 
2013. In Rand v. Commissioner (“Rand”), a divided Tax Court 
concluded that the IRS was wrong in how it calculated underpayments 
based on certain refundable tax credits.129 
Before discussing the Rand case, a bit of background is necessary. 
In order to calculate the amount of a section 6662 penalty, the first step 
is to determine the “underpayment.” The penalty is generally 20% of the 
underpayment.130 For penalty purposes, underpayment means: 
the amount by which any tax imposed by this title exceeds the 
excess of— 
(1) the sum of— 
 
 125. 2013 TIGTA REPORT, supra note 9, at 10. 
 126. TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., supra note 124, at 182. 
 127. PENALTY REFORM TASK FORCE, AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS, REPORT 
ON CIVIL TAX PENALTIES: THE NEED FOR REFORM 18 (2009). 
 128. Id. 
 129. Rand v. Comm’r, 141 T.C. 376 (2013). 
 130. See I.R.C. § 6662 (2012). The penalty can be increased to 40% in certain circumstances. 
See id. § 6662(h). 
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  (A) the amount shown as the tax by the taxpayer on his return, plus 
  (B) amounts not so shown previously assessed (or collected without 
assessment), over 
(2)  the amount of rebates made.131 
Treasury regulations set forth the underpayment calculation in the 
following formula: 
Underpayment = W– (X+Y– Z) where: 
W = the correct amount of tax required to be shown on the return; 
X = the tax reported (actually shown) on the return; 
Y = the amount not shown, but previously assessed (or collected 
without assessment); and 
Z = certain rebates.132 
Since the Section 6662 penalty was created in 1989, one issue that 
sometimes arose was how refundable tax credits fit into the 
underpayment calculation. In 1991, Treasury adopted regulations that 
stated explicitly that withholding credits under sections 31 and 33 
(“refundable withholding credits”) be included in the underpayment 
calculation.133 However, the 1991 regulations failed to address how 
refundable non-withholding tax credits, such as the Additional Child Tax 
Credit (“ACTC”) codified in section 24, the First-Time Homebuyer Tax 
Credit (“FTHBC”) codified in section 36 or the EITC codified in section 
32 (collectively, “refundable non-withholding credits”), should be 
treated.134 
Before Rand, erroneously-claimed refundable tax credits were 
included as a negative number in the “tax reported (actually shown) on 
the return,” i.e., the “X” above. As a negative amount included in “X” 
above, including the erroneously-claimed refund increased the 
underpayment. Although the regulations do not address the treatment, 
for underpayment purposes, of those refundable non-withholding credits, 
the IRS’s position was that refunds based on refundable non-withholding 
 
 131. For purposes of paragraph (2), the term “rebate” means so much of an abatement, credit, 
refund, or other repayment as was made on the ground that the tax imposed was less than the excess 
of the amount specified in paragraph (1) over the rebates previously made. Id. § 6664(a). 
 132. Id. § 6664(a)(1)-(2); Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-2(a)(1)-(2) (as amended in 2007). See also 
Snow v. Comm’r, 141 T.C. 238, 241 (2013). 
 133. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-2(b)(1), (2), and (3); see also id. § 1.6664-2(g), ex. (3); Feller v. 
Comm’r, 135 T.C. 497, 509 (2010). 
 134. See T.D. 8381, 1992-1 C.B. 374. 
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credits should be included in the underpayment calculation in the same 
manner as refundable withholding credits.135 In Rand, the Tax Court told 
the IRS the section 6662 penalty calculation was not that simple.136 
B. The Rand Case 
The facts of Rand are straightforward: the taxpayers had a tax 
liability of $144 and claimed a total of $7,471 of refundable non-
withholding tax credits, including the ACTC and the EITC.137 After 
applying the refundable credits, the taxpayers claimed, and the IRS 
issued them, a refund of $7,327 ($7,471 in tax credits - $144 in tax 
liability). The IRS and the taxpayer later agreed that the taxpayers were 
not entitled to claim the refundable credits, but disagreed on the amount 
of the underpayment. 
The IRS sought to include the $7,327 erroneously-claimed refund, 
based on the ACTC and EITC refundable credits, in its underpayment 
calculation. The taxpayers, on the other hand, argued that refundable 
credits should be excluded, or alternatively, that any underpayment be 
limited to their original $144 tax liability. The Tax Court disagreed with 
the taxpayers’ primary argument,138 but agreed with the alternative 
argument, finding that the underpayment in the case was $144, and the 
section 6662 penalty was $29 (20% of $144).139 
 
 135. See Rand v. Comm’r, 141 T.C. 376, 382 (2013). 
 136. In one of the first cases to cite Rand, the Tax Court held that the IRS could not impose 
section 6662 penalties based on erroneously-claimed first-time homebuyer credits. Li v. Comm’r, 
No. 117-12S, T.C. Summ. Op. 2013-97, at *4 (2013) (citing Rand, 141 T.C. at 384) (“We have 
recently held that refundable credits such as the first-time homebuyer credit are taken into account 
in calculating ‘the amount shown as the tax by the taxpayer on his return’ under section 
6664(a)(1)(A), but may not reduce the amount shown on the return below zero.”). See also 
Richardson v. Comm’r, No. 4280-12S, T.C. Summ. Op. 2014-9, at *8 (2014). Both the Li and 
Richardson cases are Tax Court Small tax cases (each an “S-case”) and, pursuant to section 
7463(b), are nonreviewable. 
 137. See Rand, 141 T.C. at 382. 
 138. The Tax Court reasoned: 
Because the Code specifies that certain credits should be disregarded when determining 
the tax shown on the return, we can infer that other credits should not be disregarded. 
Under the canon expressio unius est exclusio alterius, if a statute provides specific 
exceptions to a general rule, we may infer that Congress intended to exclude any further 
exceptions. . . . This is not a rigid rule and will not apply if the result “is contrary to all 
other textual and contextual evidence of congressional intent.” Burns v. United States, 
501 U.S. 129, 136 (1991) . . . . In this instance we see no evidence of a contrary 
congressional intent. 
Id. at 387 (citations omitted). 
 139. The Tax Court relied on the fact that another penalty provision, section 6694, explicitly 
discusses understatements to include refundable credits. The court noted that “Congress could have 
similarly taken such credits into account under the definition of an underpayment under section 
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In Rand, both the IRS and the taxpayers agreed on three elements 
of the underpayment calculation: the “W” was $144, and both the “Y” 
and “Z” were zero. They disagreed about the “X.” The IRS argued that 
the “X” was -$7,327, making the underpayment $7,471 (equal to $144 - 
(-$7,327)). The taxpayers argued that there was no “statutory or 
regulatory basis for reducing” the “X” below zero, thereby capping the 
underpayment at $144. 
In its decision, the court sided with the taxpayer. The court 
explained that prior to 1989, “‘underpayment’ was defined with an 
explicit cross-reference to the definition of a deficiency” in section 
6211.140 The court then stated that even though that cross-reference was 
removed in 1989, section 6211 would nevertheless “assist us in 
interpreting” the issues in the case.141 Looking to section 6211 for 
guidance, the court noted section 6211(b)(4) authorizes the IRS to treat 
“any excess of the refundable credits claimed as compared to the amount 
to which the taxpayer was entitled is treated as a negative tax” for 
deficiency purposes. However, applying the canon expressio unius est 
exclusio alterius,142 the court found that because section 6664 does not 
contain similar language (and Treasury has not addressed the issue in 
regulations), refundable non-withholding credits “would not be 
considered a negative tax.” 
As a result, the “X” in the underpayment calculation could not be 
negative based on refundable non-withholding credits. Thus, Rand’s 
penalty would not be influenced by the erroneously-claimed ACTC and 
EITC refundable credits (i.e., the “X” would be zero). 
The IRS argued to the Rand court that if its position (i.e., that 
refundable non-withholding credits be included in the underpayment 
calculation) were not accepted, it would lead to “a gap in the penalty 
regime,” leaving the IRS no means to penalize excess refundable 
credits.143 The court dismissed that argument, noting: “to the extent an 
erroneously claimed credit reduces a tax liability, it may be subject to an 
 
6664(a), but it did not.” Id. at 392. 
 140. Id. at 386. 
 141. In its decision, the court noted “the historical link between the definitions of a deficiency 
and an underpayment” but found that Congress had broken that link when in “1988 Congress 
amended section 6211(b)(4) to specifically provide that certain refundable credits could be taken 
into account as negative amounts of tax.” Id. at 391 (citing Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue 
Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, § 1015(r)(2), 102 Stat. 3342, 3572). 
 142. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 581 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “expressio unius est exclusio 
alterius” as “[w]hen certain . . . things are specified in a law, . . . an intention to exclude all others 
from its operation may be inferred”). See also Clifton Williams, Expressio Unius Est Exclusio 
Alterius, 15 MARQ. L. REV. 191, 195 (1931). 
 143. Rand, 141 T.C. at 394. 
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accuracy-related penalty under section 6662; to the extent that credit 
generates a refund, it may be subject to a penalty under section 6676.”144 
The IRS and Treasury response to Rand is not yet clear. On July 31, 
2014, the IRS Office of Chief Counsel issued a notice ordering IRS 
attorneys to concede the Rand issue in Tax Court cases, i.e., to “not treat 
claims for refund or credit based on erroneous refundable credits as a 
negative amount of tax shown on the return when determining the 
amount of an underpayment subject to penalty under section 6662 or 
6663.”145 It is unclear whether the IRS will seek to pursue the section 
6676 penalty in those cases, because section 6676 is not subject to 
Deficiency Procedures, thus not directly subject to Tax Court litigation. 
As Rand is now, absent IRS or Treasury changes, the law of the 
land, the court’s holding mandates that if the IRS wanted to penalize 
both the underpayment of tax ($144) and the erroneously-claimed refund 
($7,327), it would have to do the following: 
• impose a section 6662 penalty on the $144 underpayment; 
• impose a section 6676 penalty for the portion of the refund 
not related to the EITC, because section 6676(a) bars 
application of the penalty to EITC-related refund claims; 
and 
• impose a non-monetary section 32(k) penalty on the 
erroneously-claimed EITC.146 Section 32(k) permits the 
government to ban a taxpayer from claiming the EITC for 
either two years if she recklessly or intentionally disregards 
the EITC rules, or 10 years if she fraudulently claimed the 
EITC.147 
If the IRS sought to assess all three penalties at the same time, the 
procedural aspects would be cumbersome. The section 6662 penalty 
would be assessed through Deficiency Procedures. Thus, the taxpayer 
could challenge the section 6662 penalty in the Tax Court. 
It is unclear how, in practice, the section 32(k) penalty could be 
challenged. While section 32 penalties are clearly subject to Deficiency 
Procedures, the penalties would not be imposed until tax years 
subsequent to the year of the improper EITC claim.148 However, 
 
 144. Id. at 395. 
 145. I.R.S. Chief Couns. Notice CC-2014-007 (Jul 31, 2014). 
 146. The two-year ban under section 32(k) applies when a taxpayer recklessly or intentionally 
disregards the EITC rules. See I.R.C. § 32(k)(1)(B)(ii) (2012). The ten-year ban applies when it is 
determined that a taxpayer fraudulently claimed the EITC. See id. § 32(k)(1)(B)(i). 
 147. See id. § 32(k)(1). 
 148. The minimum penalty under section 32(k) is two years. See id. § 32(k)(1)(B)(ii). 
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taxpayers generally cannot utilize Deficiency Procedures until the IRS 
issues a Notice of Deficiency, which may or may not happen in those 
subsequent years. Thus, until those later years, there is no penalty ripe to 
challenge.149 
Lastly, because the section 6676 penalty is not subject to 
Deficiency Procedures, the taxpayer could not challenge that penalty 
along with the other two. Instead, the taxpayer would have to either pre-
pay the section 6676 penalty and pursue Refund Procedures, or wait 
until the IRS initiated collection activities and pursue CDP Procedures, 
which could lead the taxpayer back to the same Tax Court that was 
precluded from hearing the section 6676 challenge in the first place. But 
it gets worse – it is unclear how the penalty should be calculated. 
C. A Three Stooges Problem 
The problems associated with the interplay between the Rand 
decision and the calculation of section 6662 and 6676 penalties can be 
shown using the four most famous members of the Three Stooges: Moe, 
Larry, Shemp and Curly (each, a “Stooge”) (apologies to Joe and Curly 
Joe).150 Let us assume all the Stooges have a $1,000 tax liability and 
request a $500 erroneous refund based on improperly claiming $1,500 of 
different types of refundable credits. For example: 
(1) Moe improperly claims $1,500 of refundable withholding credits 
(section 31 or 33) and receives a $500 erroneous refund; 
(2) Larry improperly claims $1,500 of FTHBC and receives a $500 
erroneous refund; 
(3) Curly improperly claims $1,500 of FTHBC, but the IRS denies 
Curly’s erroneous $500 refund claim; and 
(4) Shemp improperly claims $750 of EITC (section 32) and $750 of 
FTHBC (section 36) and receives a $500 erroneous refund. 
Under current law, each taxpayer would be penalized in a different 
 
 149. A detailed discussion of the procedural problems associated with section 32(k) penalties is 
beyond the scope of this Article. However, see Leslie Book, The Ban on Claiming the EITC: A 
Problematic Penalty, PROCEDURALLY TAXING (Jan. 23, 2014), http://www.procedurallytaxing.com/
the-ban-on-claiming-the-eitc-a-problematic-penalty/. 
 150. Unbeknownst to many, Shemp was a member of the Stooges before Curly. Shemp left the 
Stooges in 1934 and was replaced by Curly. It was also in 1934 that the Stooges adopted the 
moniker the “Three Stooges.” Also, it should be noted that there were two additional members of 
the Three Stooges, Joe Besser and Curly Joe DeRita. However, Moe, Larry, Shemp, and Curly 
starred in the vast majority of films. See The Three Stooges, FILMOGRAPHY, 
http://www.threestooges.com/filmography/ (last visited Jan. 28, 2015). 
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Moe would be liable for a $300 Section 6662 penalty. 
 
Penalty Calculation—Section 6662 
 
The underpayment calculation is W[$1,000]-X[- $500] = 
$1,500.151 The “X” is -$500, the erroneously-paid $500 refund 
claim. 
The section 6662 penalty is 20% of the underpayment, $300. 
Penalty Defense 
Moe would be able to challenge the penalty prior to payment 
through Deficiency Procedures in Tax Court, and may use the 
reasonable cause defense. Moe could also pay the penalty and sue 
for refund using Refund Procedures. 
Larry 
 
Larry would be liable for a $200 section 6662 penalty and a $100 
section 6676 penalty. 
 
Penalty Calculation—Section 6662 
 
The underpayment calculation is W[$1,000]—X[=0] = $1,000. 
The underpayment is not affected by the refund because, pursuant 
to Rand, refunds based on the FTHBC do not permit the “X” to go 
below zero. 
The section 6662 penalty is 20% of the underpayment, $200. 
Penalty Calculation—Section 6676 
 




Larry would be able to challenge the section 6662 penalty prior to 
 
 151. The “Y” and the “Z” in this example, as well as the others that follow, are zero. 
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payment through Deficiency Procedures in Tax Court and may use 
the reasonable cause defense. Larry could also pay the section 
6662 penalty and sue for refund using Refund Procedures. 
To challenge the section 6676 penalty, Larry could either (i) pay 
the penalty and pursue Refund Procedures, or (ii) wait for the IRS 
to initiate collection activities and pursue CDP Procedures. Larry 
has no reasonable cause defense to the section 6676 penalty, and 




Curly would be liable for a $100 section 6676 penalty. 
 
Penalty Calculation—Section 6676 




Curly can challenge the section 6676 penalty by either (i) paying 
the penalty and pursuing Refund Procedures, or (ii) waiting for the 
IRS to initiate collection activities and pursuing CDP Procedures. 
Curly has no reasonable cause defense to the section 6676 penalty, 




Shemp would be liable for three different penalties: 
(1) a $200 Section 6662 penalty; 
(2) a non-monetary EITC penalty; and 
(3) a section 6676 penalty of between $0 and $100, but it is 
unclear how that penalty would be calculated 
(1) Penalty Calculation—Section 6662 
 
The underpayment calculation is W[$1,000] - X[$0] = $1,000. 
The section 6662 penalty is 20% of the underpayment, $200. 
(1) Penalty Defense—Section 6662 
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Shemp would be able to challenge the penalty prior to payment 
through Deficiency Procedures in Tax Court, and may use the 
reasonable cause defense. Shemp could also pay the section 6662 
penalty and sue for refund using Refund Procedures. 
(2) Non-monetary EITC penalty—Section 32 (EITC) 
Shemp would be subject to the non-monetary penalties under 
section 32(k), either a two-year or ten-year ban from claiming the 
EITC.152 
(2) Penalty Defense—Section 32 (EITC) 
It is unclear what Shemp would be able to challenge regarding the 
imposition of the section 32(k) penalty, as section 32(k) imposes 
no penalty on the year of the improper conduct (the “conduct 
year”), but only subsequent years (the “ban years”). In one case 
touching on the issue, the Tax Court permitted the IRS to deny the 
EITC for the conduct year, but ruled that the penalty was 
inappropriate for the ban years because the taxpayer’s conduct was 
not due to a “reckless or intentional disregard of the rules.”153 A 
question left unanswered is whether the court would have 
jurisdiction over those subsequent years if it found the taxpayer’s 
conduct reckless, as no EITC claims for those subsequent years 
were before the court. 
(3) Penalty Calculation—Section 6676 
Whether Shemp would be liable for a section 6676 penalty is far 
from clear. Pursuant to section 6676(a), no portion of the section 
6676 penalty can apply to the portion of a refund claim based on 
the EITC.154 But what would that mean in Shemp’s case? Shemp 
could legitimately argue that only the $750 of FTHBC should be 
included in his penalty calculations, and the $750 EITC should be 
ignored. By ignoring the EITC, the $750 FTHBC would act only 
to reduce Shemp’s tax liability from $1,000 to $250, and, more 
importantly, would not generate a refund. Thus, by Shemp’s logic, 
no section 6676 penalty could apply because there was no refund 
claim based solely on the FTHBC. 
 
 152. Section 32(k)(1)(A) provides for a “disallowance period” preventing taxpayers from 
claiming the EITC for a period of years after a taxpayer improperly claims the EITC. The 
disallowance period is either two or ten years, depending on the taxpayer’s culpability. See I.R.C. § 
32(k)(B). 
 153. Garcia v. Comm’r, T.C. Summary Op. 2013-28 (Apr. 3, 2013). 
 154. Claims for “refund or credit relating to the earned income credit under section 32” are 
excluded in I.R.C. § 6676(a). 
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Alternatively, the IRS could put forth two credible arguments: 
IRS Argument 1: The IRS could argue that half of Shemp’s $500 
refund is based on the FTHBC, and the other half is based on the 
EITC. Thus, because 50% of the refund was based on the FTHBC, the 
portion of the refund claim not attributable to the EITC (which cannot 
be penalized pursuant to section 6676(a)) would be $250, and the 
penalty would be $50 [= 20% x $250]. 
IRS Argument 2: The IRS could also take a more aggressive position: 
that the EITC reduced Shemp’s putative tax liability to $250. Thus, the 
$750 FTHBC generated the refund, and the entire $500 refund should 
be penalized, generating a $100 penalty [= 20% x $500]. 
(3) Penalty Defense—Section 6676 
Shemp would be able to challenge penalties under section 6662 and 32 
through Deficiency Procedures. However, as in Larry’s case, Shemp 
would not be able to challenge the section 6676 penalty unless he 
either (i) pays the penalty and pursues Refund Procedures, or (ii) waits 
for the IRS to initiate collection activities and pursues CDP 
Procedures. 
Shemp’s case, more than the others, highlights and raises major 
problems in post-Rand penalty enforcement. It is no wonder the IRS 
has been hesitant in imposing these Kafkaesque penalties on taxpayers. 
Even if these mostly self-inflicted problems are corrected, others lurk 
just over the horizon. 
IV. LEGAL AND PRACTICAL PROBLEMS WITH SECTION 6676 
Enforcing section 6676 after Rand is, as demonstrated above, 
challenging. However, Rand may be just the tip of the iceberg. Other 
problems are just around the corner. 
A. Petition Clause Issues155 
Without careful implantation, section 6676 could violate the First 
Amendment by putting a potential sanction on citizens’ ability to 
petition the government. Among other protections, the First Amendment 
provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging . . . the right of 
 
 155. The potential First Amendment issues appear to have been first articulated in a letter by 
attorney Derek Ho to the IRS Commissioner arguing, inter alia, that section 6676 may violate the 
petition clause of the First Amendment. See Derek Ho, Firm Cautions Against Unconstitutional 
Enforcement of Penalty Provision, TAX NOTES TODAY, June 13, 2012, at 114-15. 
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the people . . . to petition the government for a redress of grievances.”156 
That language, known as the Petition Clause, serves two invaluable 
purposes: it gives citizens a right to present their grievances against the 
government, and it allows the government to obtain information 
necessary to determine the validity of the grievances.157 The Supreme 
Court has consistently characterized the right to petition as inseparable 
from the other cognate First Amendment rights of assembly, association, 
and speech.158 
If the IRS chooses to impose section 6676 penalties without 
providing taxpayers some basic protections, it could easily violate 
taxpayers’ First Amendment protections. The basis of those protections, 
and how implementation of section 6676 could violate those protections, 
is explained below. 
The right to petition the government predates the U.S. Constitution 
by about fifty years.159 One of the earliest cases to discuss the right to 
petition in the First Amendment context is Crandall v. Nevada, decided 
in 1867.160 In Crandall, the State of Nevada sought to impose a tax on 
travelers passing through the State. The Crandall Court found that such 
a tax infringed on a traveler’s right to “assert any claim he may have 
upon that government,” thereby implicating the right to petition.161 
Section 6676 raises the same issue. 
 
 156. U.S. CONST. amend. 1. In English law, the right to petition reaches back at least to the 
Magna Carta, which stated: 
If we, our chief justice, our officials, or any of our servants offend in any respect against any man, 
or transgress any of the articles of the peace or of this security, and the offence is made known to 
four of the said twenty-five barons, they shall come to us – or in our absence from the kingdom to 
the chief justice – to declare it and claim immediate redress. 
Magna Carta, ch. 61 (1215). 
 157. Daniel R. Fischel, Antitrust Liability for Attempts to Influence Government Action: The 
Basis and Limits of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 81, 96-100 (1977). 
 158. See, e.g., James B. Perrine, Defining the “Sham Litigation” Exception to the Noerr-
Pennington Antitrust Immunity Doctrine: An Analysis of the Professional Real Estate Investors v. 
Columbia Pictures Industries Decision, 46 ALA. L. REV. 815, 835 (1995). See also Thomas v. 
Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945) (finding the right to petition as “inseparable” from the other 
rights granted by the First Amendment and noting, “It was not by accident or coincidence that the 
rights to freedom in speech and press were coupled in a single guaranty with the rights of the people 
peaceably to assemble and to petition for redress of grievances. All these, though not identical, are 
inseparable.”). 
 159. Fifty years before the Bill of Rights was adopted, the colonial assemblies treated the right 
to petition as a right deserving protection. See Norman B. Smith, “Shall Make No Law 
Abridging . . .”: An Analysis of the Neglected, but Nearly Absolute, Right of Petition, 54 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 1153, 1155 (1986); Julie M. Spanbauer, The First Amendment Right to Petition Government 
for a Redress of Grievances: Cut from a Different Cloth, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 15, 22 (1993). 
 160. Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. 35, 44 (1867). 
 161. Id. 
37
Wright: Bugus Refunds & Bad Penalties
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2015
3 - WRIGHT P547 MACRO (DO NOT DELETE) 10/21/2015  11:57 AM 
584 AKRON LAW REVIEW [48:547 
One long-recognized form of petitioning activity is seeking a tax 
refund.162 In Van Deelen v. Johnson, the Tenth Circuit acknowledged 
that “the right at issue—to petition the government for the redress of tax 
grievances—has been with us and clearly established since the Sons of 
Liberty visited Griffin’s Wharf in Boston.”163 The Van Deelen court 
discussed the breadth of the right to petition, noting that “the 
constitutionally enumerated right of a private citizen to petition the 
government for the redress of grievances does not pick and choose its 
causes but extends to matters great and small, public and private.”164 The 
court also acknowledged that even if the seeking of relief is animated by 
malevolence or self-interest, the First Amendment protects the right to 
petition of the person whose activities are genuinely aimed at procuring 
favorable government action.165 
The right to petition, like all constitutional rights, is not unfettered. 
One of the first substantive restrictions on the right to petition arose in 
1961 in Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor 
Freight, Inc. (“Noerr”), in which the Supreme Court recognized, in 
dicta, that the right to petition the government could be abridged if the 
petitioning activity was “a mere sham to cover what is actually nothing 
more than an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships 
of a competitor.”166 Four years later, the Supreme Court examined the 
scope of permissible restrictions to petitioning activity in United Mine 
Workers of America v. Pennington (“Pennington”) and held that a 
person or firm is shielded from antitrust liability if the conduct at issue 
 
 162. See, e.g., Blacklock v. United States, 208 U.S. 75 (1907); United States v. Perkins, 163 
U.S. 625 (1896). 
 163. Van Deelen v. Johnson, 497 F.3d 1151, 1158 (10th Cir. 2007). The right to petition was 
imported from English law and has been recognized as early as 1031, and a right to petition was 
included in the Magna Carta. See Smith, supra note 159, at 1154-55: 
The earliest petition recorded in our Anglo-American constitutional history is the English leaders’ 
petition in 1013 to Aethelred the Unready. . . . [The] Magna Carta of 1215, the fundamental source 
of Anglo-American liberties, was the king’s response to the barons’ petition. This was one of 
several royal charters granted by Medieval English kings to guarantee baronial privileges and, to a 
lesser extent, popular rights. Petitioning as a right was specifically recognized in Magna Carta. 
 164. Van Deelen, 497 F.3d at 1153. The court went on to add that “a private citizen exercises a 
constitutionally protected First Amendment right anytime he or she petitions the government for 
redress; the petitioning clause of the First Amendment does not pick and choose its causes. The 
minor and questionable, along with the mighty and consequential, are all embraced.” Id. at 1156. 
 165. City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 380 (1991) (quoting Allied 
Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 500 n.4, (1988)). Moreover, “Resort to 
administrative, legislative, political or judicial processes is protected by the first amendment so long 
as the petitioner is concerned with obtaining relief afforded by the system.” LeBlanc-Sternberg v. 
Fletcher, 781 F. Supp. 261, 266 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (citing Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365 
and California Motor Transport. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972)). 
 166. E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 135 (1961). 
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constitutes legitimate First Amendment petitioning activity.167 
After Noerr and Pennington, courts have shaped the contours of 
attempted restrictions to the right to petition the government through 
what has been called the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.168 The doctrine 
holds generally that the act of petitioning the government deserves 
especially broad protection from liability (often antitrust liability) in the 
absence of proof that the petitioning activity is a “sham.”169 The Noerr-
Pennington doctrine seeks to maintain the equilibrium in the tradeoff 
between deterring predatory activity and deterring petitioning activity.170 
 
 167. United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 668 (1965). 
 168. The doctrine takes its name from the first two cases that the Supreme Court considered in 
this jurisprudential line. See Noerr, 365 U.S. 127 and Pennington, 381 U.S. 657. In Noerr, a group 
of trucking companies and their trade association filed an antitrust lawsuit against major railroads, 
the presidents of those railroads, and their public relations firm. The plaintiffs’ complaint alleged 
that the defendants had conspired to restrict trade and monopolize the long-distance freight business 
in violation of the Sherman Act. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants’ public relations firm 
lobbied Congress with the sole purpose of injuring the truckers, harming their reputation, and 
impeding their ability to compete against railroad companies. Id. at 129-30. The Court held that 
when the railroads lobbied the government to pass laws restraining the trucking companies, they 
were merely exercising their constitutional right to petition the government. Id. at 136. Although the 
Court found no antitrust violation, it noted that antitrust laws may apply in cases where such 
lobbying was “a mere sham to cover what is actually nothing more than an attempt to interfere 
directly with the business relationships of a competitor.” Id. at 144. 
 169. See Matthew Avery et al., The Antitrust Implications of Filing “Sham” Citizen Petitions 
with the FDA, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 113, 117 (2013) (internal citations omitted). Sham litigation 
presents a problem because individuals or businesses “may use litigation solely as an attempt to 
raise its rivals’ costs disproportionately, erect barriers to market entry, or facilitate collusive 
behavior.” James D. Hurwitz, Abuse of Governmental Processes, the First Amendment, and the 
Boundaries of Noerr, 74 GEO. L.J. 65, 70 (1985). Some courts have pushed the definition of 
“petitioning”—the most fundamental limitation on the scope of Noerr immunity—to its limits, 
stretching it to encompass even communications that entail no government involvement at all. This 
view is best exemplified by the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Coastal States Marketing, Inc. v. Hunt. 
Coastal States was alleged to be dealing in pirated oil illegally seized by the Libyan government 
and, as a result, was the target of threats of litigation. Coastal States Marketing, Inc. v. Hunt, 694 
F.2d 1358 (5th Cir. 1983). These threats were directed at specific entities—including Coastal States, 
its customers, and third party contractors—and published generally. Coastal States argued that the 
threats—as opposed to the litigation itself—were not directed at the government and therefore could 
not constitute immunized petitioning, but the Fifth Circuit held otherwise. Id. at 1367. According to 
the court: “Given that petitioning immunity protects joint litigation, it would be absurd to hold that 
it does not protect those acts reasonably and normally attendant upon effective litigation. The 
litigator should not be protected only when he strikes without warning.” Id. 
 170. See Christopher C. Klein, Strategic Sham Litigation: Economic Incentives in the Context 
of the Case Law, 6 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 241, 245-51 (1986); Paul L. Joskow & Alvin K. 
Klevorick, A Framework for Analyzing Predatory Pricing Policy, 89 YALE L.J. 213 (1979) (arguing 
that antitrust bans on predatory pricing must balance the benefit of deterring predatory pricing 
against the cost of deterring desirable price-cutting). The same tradeoff is present for non-antitrust 
doctrines that deal with the problem of frivolous suits and strategic litigation. See Ronald J. Gilson, 
The Devolution of the Legal Profession: A Demand Side Perspective, 49 MD. L. REV. 869, 877-82 
(1990) (arguing with respect to malicious prosecution and professional rules of conduct that any 
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Courts have extended the Noerr-Pennington doctrine from 
petitioning to various other claims made under both federal and state 
law.171 Although the sham petitioning exception was initially recognized 
in Noerr, an exact definition of a sham petition was largely undefined 
until in 1972,172 when the U.S. Supreme Court decided California Motor 
Transport v. Trucking Unlimited (“California Motor Transport”).173 
California Motor Transport involved a dispute between two 
trucking companies in which the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had 
conspired to injure plaintiff’s business by filing numerous lawsuits in 
state and federal court.174 The court focused on the defendant’s litigation 
strategy, which it characterized as involving the institution of suits “with 
or without probable cause, and regardless of the merits of the cases.”175 
In finding for the plaintiff, the court determined that the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine was applicable not only to petitioning activities but 
also to litigation activities.176 Ultimately, the court decided that the 
defendant’s litigation activities were a sham and thus outside of the 
Noerr-Pennington immunity.177 
California Motor Transport was the Supreme Court’s first extended 
 
definition of strategic litigation must trade off over- and under-inclusion); Avery Katz, The Effect of 
Frivolous Lawsuits on the Settlement of Litigation, 10 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 3, 26 (1990) 
(concluding that the English rule of assessing legal expenses against the loser may help deter 
frivolous suits, but only at the cost of deterring meritorious suits). 
 171. “Although the Noerr-Pennington doctrine was initially recognized in the antitrust field, 
the federal courts have by analogy applied it to claims brought under both state and federal laws.” 
Campbell v. PMI Food Equip. Group, Inc., 509 F.3d 776, 790 (6th Cir. 2007). The Ninth Circuit has 
applied the PRE test to retaliation claims under the Fair Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 
81 (1968). See White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1231 (9th Cir. 2000). Specifically, the Ninth Circuit 
noted that “Noerr-Pennington is a label for a form of First Amendment protection; to say that one 
does not have Noerr-Pennington immunity is to conclude that one’s petitioning activity is 
unprotected by the First Amendment.” Id. 
 172. See Paul More, Protections against Retaliatory Employer Lawsuits after BE&K 
Construction v. NLRB, 25 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 205, 223 (2004). 
 173. California Motor Transport v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972). 
 174. Id at 509. 
 175. Id. at 512. 
 176. Id. at 513:  
Opponents before agencies or courts often think poorly of the other’s tactics, motions, or 
defenses and may readily call them baseless. One claim, which a court or agency may 
think baseless, may go unnoticed; but a pattern of baseless, repetitive claims may emerge 
which leads the factfinder to conclude that the administrative and judicial processes have 
been abused. That may be a difficult line to discern and draw. But once it is drawn, the 
case is established that abuse of those processes produced an illegal result, viz., 
effectively barring respondents from access to the agencies and courts. Insofar as the 
administrative or judicial processes are involved, actions of that kind cannot acquire 
immunity by seeking refuge under the umbrella of “political expression.” 
 177. Id. at 515-16. 
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treatment of the “sham” exception to the Noerr-Pennington immunity.178 
In the following years, however, courts “wrestled with the boundaries of 
the sham litigation exception.”179 In 1993, the Supreme Court addressed 
the scope of the sham litigation exception in Professional Real Estate 
Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. (“PRE”).180 In PRE, 
the court outlined a two-part definition of sham litigation, requiring the 
litigation to be (1) “objectively baseless in the sense that no reasonable 
litigant could realistically expect success on the merits,” and (2) “an 
attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a 
competitor.”181 The court concluded that if the first test was satisfied, the 
suit was “immunized under Noerr.”182 
The right to pursue all but objectively baseless petitions is a 
necessary ingredient in the U.S. system of justice.183 The Noerr-
Pennington doctrine provides protection to petitioning activity unless 
that activity is “objectively baseless” as set forth in PRE. However, 
section 6676 sanctions refund requests “lacking a reasonable basis,” a 
standard significantly higher than the “objectively baseless standard” set 
forth in PRE. As such, absent some procedural safeguards, imposing the 
section 6676 penalty could easily violate the First Amendment by 
chilling a taxpayer’s rights to seek refund that is objectively non-
baseless. 
As noted in Part II, the IRS appears to have adopted the “reasonable 
basis” standard used in Treasury Regulation § 1.6662-3(b)(3). Thus, the 
IRS can impose a section 6676 penalty so long as it determines a refund 
claim is not reasonably based on the specific types of authority outlined 
 
 178. The “sham” exception was first articulated in the Noerr case itself, in which the Supreme 
Court held that there may be instances in which a petitioning effort “ostensibly directed toward 
influencing governmental action, is a mere sham to cover what is actually nothing more than an 
attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor.” E. R.R. Presidents 
Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc, 365 U.S. 127, 144 (1961). 
 179. More, supra note 172, at 224. 
 180. Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49 (1993) 
[hereinafter PRE]. 
 181. Id. at 60-61. 
 182. Id. at 60. The objectively baseless standard can be found in other areas as well, 
particularly Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rule 11”). Rule 11 requires an 
attorney in federal court to certify that, after reasonable inquiry, there is an adequate legal and 
factual basis for submissions to the court. FED. R. CIV. P. 11. Attorneys violating Rule 11 face 
sanctions, and courts, in determining whether to impose those sanctions, apply standards consistent 
with the “baseless” standard set forth by Justice Thomas in PRE. See, e.g., Jerold S. Solovy et al., 
Happy (?) Birthday Rule 11: Sanctions Under Rule 11: A Cross-Circuit Comparison, 37 LOY. L.A. 
L. REV. 727 (2004); Lisa Wood, In Praise of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 18 ANTITRUST A.B.A. 
72 (2003). 
 183. See, e.g., Wood, supra note 182. 
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in Treasury Regulation § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(iii), which generally includes 
the Code, existing, temporary, and proposed Treasury Regulations, 
published IRS materials, and case law.184 The reasonable basis standard 
surely exceeds the “objectively baseless” standard articulated in PRE. 
In addition to the higher standard, the lack of a means to challenge 
the penalty prior to assessment exacerbates the First Amendment issue. 
As noted above, section 6676 is an immediately assessable penalty with 
no good faith defenses. As such, it is essentially an immediately 
assessable strict liability penalty for taxpayers. Such penalties have been 
deemed appropriate in limited circumstances.185 Those circumstances 
include situations in which “the prohibited activity ‘impairs the 
efficiency of controls deemed essential to the social order as presently 
constituted.’”186 
However, in circumstances in which a strict liability statute touches 
on protected First Amendment activity (as is the case with section 6676), 
the Supreme Court has noted that strict liability penalties may have the 
effect of “inhibiting the freedom of expression, by making the individual 
the more reluctant to exercise it.”187 The Court also added that First 
Amendment protections are warranted to “assure to the freedoms of 
speech and press that ‘breathing space’ essential to their fruitful 
exercise.”188 
Because of the potential chill a strict liability penalty could have on 
protected First Amendment rights, courts generally require some 
safeguards prior to the imposition of a penalty.189 In fact, the “Ninth 
Circuit has explained that [u]nder the Noerr-Pennington rule of statutory 
 
 184. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(iii) (as amended in 2003). 
 185. See American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. City of Dearborn, 418 F.3d 600, 610 
(6th Cir. 2005). Most strict liability penalties are related to the regulation of motor vehicles, 
commercial goods, or food and drug legislation where the safety and health of the public is of 
ultimate concern. Id. (citing Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 152-53 (1960)). 
 186. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 418 F.3d at 610 (citing Morissette v. United 
States, 342 U.S. 246, 256 (1952)). 
 187. Smith, 361 U.S. at 151. See also Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (holding 
that the First Amendment protections at issue were “fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of 
ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people”). 
 188. Sosa v. DirecTV, Inc., 437 F.3d 923, 933 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, 
Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974)). 
 189. An exception to this general rule is commercial speech. See, e.g., American-Arab Anti-
Discrimination Comm., 418 F.3d at 611 n.7 (“the Supreme Court has held that the usual concern of 
chilling protected speech ‘applies weakly, if at all, in the ordinary commercial context.’ Bates v. 
State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 380 (1977). Strict liability regimes regulating commercial speech 
have thus been approved because ‘the economic motivations that inspire advertising neutralize the 
fear that protected speech will be chilled.’” Accounting Outsourcing, L.L.C. v. Verizon Wireless 
Pers. Comm., L.P., 329 F. Supp. 2d 789, 812 (M.D. La. 2004)). 
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construction, we must construe federal statutes so as to avoid burdening 
conduct that implicates the protections afforded by the Petition Clause 
unless the statute clearly provides otherwise.”190 Section 6676 lacks such 
a safeguard. 
The refund claims of Fraudsters deserve no First Amendment 
protection because they are, by their very nature, objectively baseless. 
However, refund claims of Strivers and Gamers often fall short of being 
“objectively baseless.” Instead, those refund claims, based on errors of 
law or fact, will often have some objective, albeit erroneous, basis. As 
such, any infringement on their right to claim that non-baseless refund 
must be afforded some minimum First Amendment protections. As 
drafted, section 6676 offers no such protections. 
B. Imperfect Claims for Refund 
Another problem with section 6676 is that the IRS, through 
informal guidance to its employees, sought to broaden the reach of 
section 6676 by extending its reach to inchoate refund claims. As set 
forth below, there is no legal or policy justification for the IRS’s actions. 
The IRS has asserted that the section 6676 penalty applies to 
informal claims for refunds,191 i.e., refund claims that fail to meet the 
formal requirements of the law governing refund claims.192 However, no 
court has had the opportunity to opine on the matter, and nothing in the 
Code or Treasury Regulations supports the IRS’s position. Moreover, 
the IRS’s position opens a Pandora’s box of thorny legal issues for the 
IRS and could ultimately cause the IRS more harm than good. 
The rules determining what constitutes a valid refund claim are 
delineated in the Code and regulations, to wit: a legally sufficient claim 
for refund must set forth, in a written declaration that is executed under 
penalties of perjury, each ground upon which a refund is claimed and 
facts sufficient to apprise the Commissioner of the exact basis of the 
claim.193 Claims for refund must generally be filed “within [three] years 
from the time the return was filed or [two] years from the time the tax 
 
 190. See Hartman v. Great Seneca Fin. Corp., 569 F.3d 606, 615 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Sosa, 
437 F.3d at 931). 
 191. See IRM 20.1.5.16(3) (Jan. 24, 2012) (“The [section 6676] penalty applies to all claims, 
formal and informal, relating to federal income taxes.”). 
 192. Treasury regulations set forth the requirements for a valid claim for refund. See Treas. 
Reg. § 301.6402-2(b)(1) (as amended in 1977); id. § 301.6402-3(a) (as amended in 2014). 
 193. See Treas. Reg. § 301.6402-2. The regulations do offer some flexibility for less-than-
complete compliance with the rules and permit the IRS to consider claims, provided the taxpayer 
sets forth detailed grounds upon which the refund is claimed and a factual basis for the claim and 
includes a jurat. See id. § 301.6402-2(b)(1). 
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was paid, whichever of such periods expires the later.”194 To request a 
refund consistent with section 6511, taxpayers may either claim a refund 
on the tax return itself, or file an amended return claiming the refund.195 
Although the law states that claims for refund failing to comply 
with the regulatory requirements will not be considered, courts, “with 
the IRS’s reluctant acquiescence,” have fashioned an equitable remedy 
for taxpayers failing to meet the strict legal and regulatory 
requirements—the informal claim doctrine.196 The informal claim 
doctrine allows taxpayers to toll “the statute of limitations related to 
refund claims when a taxpayer puts the Service ‘on notice’ of a pending 
refund claim, but fails to satisfy the formalities outlined in the 
regulations for filing a valid claim.”197 For an informal claim to be 
considered adequate, courts and the IRS generally require the claim to (i) 
be in writing, (ii) apprise the IRS that a refund is being claimed, and (iii) 
specify the tax and the year or years for which the refund is being 
sought.198 
The Supreme Court first recognized the informal claim doctrine in 
1941, and the doctrine has been recognized by the courts and the IRS 
ever since.199 In cases in which the informal claim doctrine has been 
applied, the courts have required taxpayers to supplement their informal 
 
 194. See I.R.C. § 6511(a) (2012), which states: 
Claim for credit or refund of an overpayment of any tax imposed by this title in respect of which tax 
the taxpayer is required to file a return shall be filed by the taxpayer within 3 years from the time 
the return was filed or 2 years from the time the tax was paid, whichever of such periods expires the 
later, or if no return was filed by the taxpayer, within 2 years from the time which the tax was paid. 
 195. Treas. Reg. § 301.6402-3. “A return or amended return shall constitute a claim for refund 
or credit if it contains a statement setting forth the amount determined as an overpayment and 
advising [the Internal Revenue Service] whether such amount shall be refunded to the taxpayer or 
shall be applied as a credit.” Id. § 301.6402-3(a)(5). 
 196. See BCS Fin. Corp. v. United States, 118 F.3d 522, 524 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 197. See United States v. Commercial Nat’l Bank of Peoria, 874 F.2d 1165, 1175-76 (7th Cir. 
1989) (holding that the taxpayer met the claim requirement where the taxpayer first filed a timely 
letter with the IRS that requested a refund and, subsequently, filed a formal refund claim). See also 
William A. Neilson, Informal Claims For Refund—A Winding Road, 26 AKRON TAX J. 147, 148 
(2011). 
 198. See MICHAEL I. SALTZMAN & LESLIE BOOK, IRS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE ¶ 11.08[2]; 
see also Neilson, supra note 197, at 152. 
 199. See United States v. Kales, 314 U.S. 186, 194 (1941), holding: 
A notice fairly advising the Commissioner of the nature of the taxpayer’s claim, which 
the Commissioner could reject because too general or because it does not comply with 
formal requirements of the statute and regulations, will nevertheless be treated as a claim 
where formal defects and lack of specificity have been remedied by amendment filed 
after the lapse of the statutory period. 
See also AmBase Corp. v. United States, 731 F.3d 109, 118 (2d Cir. 2013); Furst v. United States, 
678 F.2d 147, 151 (Ct. Cl. 1982); Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp. v. United States, 318 
F.2d 915, 923 (Ct. Cl. 1963). 
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claims with proper formal claims before initiating litigation, to give the 
government a “full opportunity to address the problem 
administratively.”200 In effect, the courts have required the filing of a 
valid refund claim as a prerequisite to application of the informal claims 
doctrine. 
The IRS’s decision to apply section 6676 penalties to informal 
claims is contrary to that history. As a preliminary matter, the IRS’s 
position runs contrary to the Code and Treasury regulations. Section 
6676, on its face, applies only to a taxpayer’s “claim for refund,” and the 
rules governing claims for refund can be found in section 6511 and its 
implementing regulations. Implicit in those rules is the assumption that 
“claims for refund,” as used in section 6511 and its regulations, means 
valid claims for refund. Otherwise, section 6511 would stand for the 
absurd proposition that its rules apply to invalid claims, which would 
obviate the need for a definition of valid claims. 
If you accept that the validity of a claim is an implicit assumption 
in 6511, as a matter of statutory construction, the same rule should be 
applied to section 6676, absent evidence to the contrary.201 No such 
evidence exists. Moreover, nothing in what little legislative history 
exists with respect to section 6676 indicates, or even suggests, that 
invalid refund claims should fall within the purview of the penalty. 
More damning is Treasury Regulation § 301.6402-2(b)(1), which 
directly contradicts the IRS’s position, stating that a refund claim that 
fails to comply with the formal requirements of a refund claim “will not 
be considered for any purpose as a claim for refund.”202 If the IRS 
sought to impose the section 6676 penalty for an informal refund claim, 
no court would likely rule in the IRS’s favor. That, however, is not the 
end of the discussion. 
C. An Avoidable Penalty 
“Only the little people pay taxes” 
—Leona Helmsley 
The above quote, attributable to the “Queen of Mean,”203 is not 
 
 200. Greene-Thapedi v. United States, 549 F.3d 530, 533 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing BCS Fin. 
Corp., 118 F.3d at 524-25). 
 201. For a detailed examination of the statutory construction of tax statutes, see Michael 
Livingston, Congress, the Courts, and the Code: Legislative History and the Interpretation of Tax 
Statutes, 69 TEX. L. REV. 819 (1991). 
 202. Treas. Reg. § 301.6402-2(b)(1) (as amended in 1977) (emphasis added). 
 203.  Leona Helmsley was nicknamed the “Queen of Mean” in various periodicals, and that 
nickname was memorialized by a 1990 movie of her life, aptly titled, Leona Helmsley: the Queen of 
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true,204 but it may be accurate with respect to those from whom the IRS 
will collect section 6676 penalties. As drafted, section 6676 penalties 
may be entirely avoidable through procedural planning. One such 
strategy, set forth below, requires a fairly sophisticated understanding of 
tax procedure. As such, for all practical purposes, only taxpayers who 
can afford tax counsel can likely avail themselves of it, resulting in 
penalty enforcement primarily against the Strivers, i.e., “the little 
people” referenced by Helmsley above. 
One method for avoiding the penalty, outlined in a 2011 Tax Notes 
article,205 is as follows: 
1. Taxpayer files a federal tax return without the transaction that 
may give rise to the refund (the “Questionable Transaction”). 
2. Taxpayer files an amended tax return seeking only a nominal 
portion of the benefits of the Questionable Transaction. In the 
amended return, the taxpayer discloses all the relevant legal and 
factual issues regarding the Questionable Transaction, but seeks 
only some small portion of the Questionable Transaction’s tax 
benefits. 
3. Taxpayer waits to see what the IRS does: 
a) if the IRS accepts the taxpayer’s request, the taxpayer then 
requests the full amount; 
b) if the IRS denies the taxpayer’s request, the taxpayer files 
a refund suit, requesting full amount of Questionable 
 
Mean (CBS television broadcast Sept. 23, 1990). See IMDB, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0100004 
(last visited Apr. 5, 2015). 
 204. According to the Congressional Budget Office, for 2010 (the latest year available as of 
this writing), “[h]ouseholds in the top quintile (including the top percentile) paid 68.8 percent of all 
federal taxes, households in the middle quintile paid 9.1 percent, and those in the bottom quintile 
paid 0.4 percent of federal taxes.” CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLD 
INCOME AND FEDERAL TAXES, 2010, at 1 (2013), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/
files/cbofiles/attachments/44604-AverageTaxRates.pdf. 
 205. See Donald B. Susswein, Is There a Disclosure Exception to the Economic Substance 
Penalty?, TAX NOTES TODAY, Nov. 14, 2011, at 221-13. See also Gerald A. Kafka & Paul B. 
Hynes, Jr, Recent Developments to Consider When Filing Formal and Informal Claims for Refund, 
2011 TAX EXECUTIVES INST. 137, available at http://www.tei.org/news/articles/Pages/TTE-MJ11-
Recent-Developments-to-Consider-When-Filing-Formal-and-Informal-Claims-for-Refund.aspx. 
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Transaction’s tax benefits.206 
Under this scenario, the IRS would be able to assert the section 
6676 penalty only if it denied the taxpayer’s request, but the penalty 
would apply only to the nominal portion of the Questionable 
Transaction’s tax benefits that would have generated a refund. This is 
because section 6676 applies only to IRS administrative refunds, not 
refunds requested in litigation.207 Thus, because the full refund claim 
was not made to the IRS, but instead to a court in a refund action, the 
IRS could not seek to impose the section 6676 penalty to the full amount 
of the Questionable Transaction’s tax benefits that generated the 
potential refund. 
A reasonable question at this point is what would happen if the IRS 
accepted the claim. If it never challenged the transaction, the taxpayer 
would keep all the Questionable Transaction’s tax benefits. If the IRS 
later determined that the transaction’s tax benefits should have been 
denied, the IRS would be hard-pressed to argue that a taxpayer relying 
on the IRS’s own determination (i.e., the initial decision accepting the 
Questionable Transaction’s benefits) did not have a reasonable basis. For 
taxpayers, it would be a “heads I win, tails you lose” gambit. 
One potential problem for a taxpayer seeking to use this strategy 
could be the variance doctrine, which bars taxpayers from raising new 
issues relating to their tax claims unless the new issue is “derived from 
or is integral to the ground timely raised in the [initial] refund claim.”208 
The variance doctrine is derived from Treasury regulations that require 
taxpayers to set forth specific grounds for their refund claims.209 
It is unclear how a court would view the taxpayer in this 
circumstance. On the one hand, the taxpayer has, as the regulation 
requires, “set forth in detail each ground upon which a credit or refund is 
 
 206. Pursuant to I.R.C. § 6532(a)(1) (2012), the taxpayer must generally wait six months 
before filing a refund suit. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Ottawa Silica Co. v. United States, 699 F.2d 1124, 1139 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
 209. See Treas. Reg. § 301.6402-2(b)(1) (as amended in 1977), which states: 
No refund or credit will be allowed after the expiration of the statutory period of 
limitation applicable to the filing of a claim therefor except upon one or more of the 
grounds set forth in a claim filed before the expiration of such period. The claim must set 
forth in detail each ground upon which a credit or refund is claimed and facts sufficient 
to apprise the Commissioner of the exact basis thereof. . . . A claim which does not 
comply with this paragraph will not be considered for any purpose as a claim for refund 
or credit. 
See also United States v. Felt & Tarrant Co., 283 U.S. 269, 270 (1931); J.P. Stevens Engraving Co. 
v. United States, 53 F.2d 1, 2 (5th Cir. 1931). 
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claimed and facts sufficient to apprise the Commissioner of the exact 
basis [of the refund claim],” by disclosing all the relevant legal and 
factual issues regarding the Questionable Transaction.210 In such a case, 
the taxpayer would appear to have satisfied the variance doctrine 
requirements, as there would be no “new” factual or legal theories at 
issue.211 
On the other hand, the IRS could argue that there is substantial 
factual variance from the filed refund claims and the refund claim before 
the court, namely the difference between the nominal refund request to 
the IRS, and the full refund request before the court. Whether a court 
would side with the IRS here is unknown. At least one writer, however, 
has noted that the strategy is “risky.”212 
V. A BETTER REFUND PENALTY 
Section 6676, which was enacted to deter Fraudsters and Gamers, 
fails miserably at meeting its intended targets. Instead, it created more 
work for the government, and, judging by the increase in bogus refund 
schemes, may have emboldened those seeking to cheat the government 
through the bogus refund schemes described in Part I. 
Despite its failures, however, a properly implemented section 6676 
penalty could fill the gap in the current penalty regime exposed by the 
Rand court. Absent section 6676, there would be no effective sanction 
on filing erroneous (as opposed to fraudulent) refund claims. Thus, at the 
margins, rational taxpayers would be encouraged to push the envelope 
by taking aggressive positions because there would be little sanction to 
such behavior. An effective penalty would seek to balance the IRS need 
 
 210. Treas. Reg. § 301.6402-2(b)(1). Courts have found that the requirement “is designed both 
to prevent surprise and to give adequate notice to the [IRS] of the nature of the claim and the 
specific facts upon which it is predicated, thereby permitting an administrative investigation and 
determination.” Computervision Corp. v. United States, 445 F.3d 1355, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2006) 
(quoting Alexander Proudfoot Co. v. United States, 454 F.2d 1379, 1383, 197 Ct. Cl. 219 (Ct. Cl. 
1972)). See also Cencast Servs., L.P. v. United States, 729 F.3d 1352, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Union 
Pac. R.R. Co. v. United States, 389 F.2d 437, 443 (Ct. Cl. 1968) (citing Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co., 
283 U.S. 269); Real Estate-Land Title & Trust Co. v. United States, 309 U.S. 13, 17-18 (1940); Int’l 
Curtis Marine Turbine Co. v. United States, 56 F.2d 708 (Ct. Cl. 1932); The Midvale Co. v. United 
States, 138 F. Supp. 269 (Ct. Cl. 1956); Williamson v. United States, 292 F.2d 524 (Ct. Cl. 1961)); 
Herrington v. United States, 416 F.2d 1029, 1032 (10th Cir. 1969) (“Thus, if the claim fairly 
apprises the Service of the ground on which recovery is sought or if the Service actually considers 
the ground later sought to be raised the claim will be held adequate for . . . bringing suit under § 
7422.”); Garvey, Inc. v. United States, 1 Cl. Ct. 108 (1983). 
 211. See, e.g., Lockheed Martin Corp. v. United States, 210 F.3d 1366, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2000); 
Ottawa Silica Co., 699 F.2d at 1139. 
 212. See Coder, supra note 109. 
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to discourage overly aggressive refund claims with taxpayers’ freedom 
not to “pay more than the law demands.”213 
Fortunately, many of the problems associated with section 6676 can 
be corrected, and the IRS and Treasury can make the gravamen of the 
necessary changes without congressional intervention. However, to 
make section 6676 effective, Congress needs to step in. 
In section IV.A, I will outline the steps the IRS and Treasury can 
take to correct the most glaring problems associated with the penalty. It 
is up to Congress to do the rest, and those steps are outlined in section 
IV.B. 
A. Administrative Changes 
1. Fix the First Amendment Issue 
The government should first address the First Amendment issue by 
providing a mechanism to challenge section 6676 penalties prior to 
assessment. Section 6676 has two related First Amendment problems: 
(1) the reasonable basis standard is contrary to PRE, and (2) section 
6676, lacking a right to a pre-assessment challenge, unduly burdens 
taxpayers’ ability to petition the government. Although both problems 
touch on the constitutional issues, both do not necessarily need to be 
corrected. Rather, allowing a pre-assessment challenge (while retaining 
the reasonable basis standard) would likely be enough to pass 
constitutional muster. Moreover, such a change could be easily 
implemented and would not require an act of Congress. 
a. Provide a Pre-Assessment Challenge 
To ameliorate the First Amendment concerns while retaining the 
reasonable basis standard, the IRS and Treasury should provide 
taxpayers with the right to challenge the penalty prior to assessment. 
Although section 6676 falls within the sections of the Code that permit 
immediately assessable penalties (Subtitle F, Chapter 68, Subchapter B: 
Assessable Penalties (“Subchapter B”)), nothing in the Code precludes 
the IRS and Treasury from providing a pre-assessment challenge to the 
penalty.214 In fact, one Subchapter B penalty permits a reasonable cause 
exception to the penalty, which implicitly recognizes a pre-assessment 
 
 213.  Comm’r v. Newman, 159 F.2d 848, 851 (1947) (Hand, J., dissenting). 
 214. Section 6676 was enacted in Subchapter B of Chapter 68 of the Code. The rules for 
Subchapter B are found in section 6671. See I.R.C. §§ 6671, 6676 (2012). 
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right for taxpayers to challenge the penalty.215 
What type of pre-assessment challenge? Some commenters have 
argued that section 6676 penalties should be subject to Deficiency 
Procedures, giving taxpayers the right to challenge the penalty as any 
other return-related penalty.216 Others have argued that section 6664 be 
amended to include refundable tax credit disallowances in full, so 6662 
penalties would apply in the Rand-type case.217 The former, in addition 
to requiring an act of Congress,218 is both unwarranted and unnecessary. 
The latter, as noted infra, would make section 6676 a better penalty. 
Deficiency Procedures presuppose tax deficiencies and provide 
protections to taxpayers based on the positions they take on returns 
accepted by the IRS.219 Unlike other tax penalties, however, section 
6676 penalties are based on mere claims for refund.220 There is no 
requirement that the claim for refund be based on a tax deficiency, as 
may be the case in frozen refund situations. Thus, Deficiency Procedures 
are inappropriate, as they would layer the penalty with additional and 
unnecessary requirements, and would require the introduction of a slew 
of procedures not required to address erroneous refund claims. More 
importantly, Deficiency Procedures would also significantly decrease the 
immediacy of the penalty, which could be a useful tool to discourage 
taxpayers from making overly aggressive erroneous refund claims. 
 
 215. The reasonable cause defense requires taxpayers to make an affirmative showing of all the 
facts the taxpayer contends provide reasonable cause. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 301.6651-1(c)(1) (as 
amended in 2004). 
 216. See, e.g., Sharon M. Fisk & Heather Kim Lee, Section 6676 Erroneous Claim for Refund 
or Credit Penalty: The Penalty Has No Reasonable Basis, 1 TAX DEV. J. 26 (2009). 
 217.  See Carlton M. Smith, IRS Wrongly Ignores the 20 Percent Excessive Refund Penalty, 
TAX NOTES TODAY, Feb. 27, 2013, at 39-10. 
 218. Because section 6676 is in Subchapter B, to permit Deficiency Procedures, Congress 
would either have to renumber section 6676 to include it in Subtitle F, Chapter 63 (possibly by 
adding the penalty to section 6662) or change the law to allow taxpayers to challenge the penalty 
through Deficiency Procedures. 
 219. “Deficiency” is defined generally in the Code as the difference between the correct tax 
and the tax reported on a return. See I.R.C. § 6211(a). For individuals who fail to file returns, the 
Code permits the IRS to make a return, generally referred to as a “Substitute For Return” (“SFR”), 
which will be treated as that person’s return for tax purposes. See id. § 6020(b)(1). It is not until 
after the SFR has been filed that the IRS can issue a Notice of Deficiency. See Leslie Book, Notice 
of Deficiency in Substitute for Return Setting, PROCEDURALLY TAXING (Dec. 5, 2013), 
http://www.procedurallytaxing.com/notice-of-deficiency-in-substitute-for-return-setting/ (“IRS 
generally cannot assess tax based upon the liability in the SFR until it issues a statutory notice of 
deficiency giving the taxpayer the right to petition the Tax Court.”). See also Claudia Hill & Frank 
Degen, Nat’l Ass’n Enrolled Agents, Presentation at the IRS Nationwide Tax Forum: Dealing with 
SFRs and ASFRs -Substitutes for Returns—IRC 6020(b) (2013), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/2013_NTF_Dealing_with_SFRs.pdf. 
 220. See I.R.C. § 6676. 
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A better solution would be to provide taxpayers with an explicit 
right to challenge the section 6676 penalty. Such a right could retain the 
reasonable basis standard (though, as argued infra, that is not the best 
standard), but provide a clear mechanism for taxpayers to make their 
case to the IRS. Such a right would likely solve the potential First 
Amendment issues, as it would give taxpayers a clear means to avoid the 
immediate imposition of the penalty. Such a right, coupled with a 
taxpayer’s ability to utilize either CDP or Refund Procedures, should be 
enough to overcome the First Amendment concerns. 
b. Reasonable Basis v. Objectively Baseless? 
One possible First Amendment solution would be to change the law 
and adopt the objectively baseless standard, making only refund claims 
that fail the standard subject to penalty. The objectively baseless 
standard, consistent with PRE, would require the government to show 
that no reasonable taxpayer could expect success on the merits. The 
objectively baseless standard may well work for Fraudster refund 
claims; however, for claims based on errors of fact or law (i.e., Strivers 
and Gamers refund claims), that standard would not provide much 
deterrence, as any non-baseless claim would escape penalty. 
The rules of eligibility for refundable tax credits are often complex, 
requiring taxpayers to make sometimes intricate determinations and tax 
calculations. A properly functioning refund claim penalty would ask 
taxpayers to determine carefully the merits of their claim before 
requesting a refund based on refundable credits. However, by lowering 
the bar to the objectively baseless standard, taxpayers would have less 
incentive to exercise care in determining their eligibility for credits. 
Thus, taxpayers who would otherwise have exercised more care (to 
avoid the penalty) will be dis-incentivized to exercise care if they would 
be penalized only for objectively baseless refund claims. Simply stated, 
changing the standard to objectively baseless is not the best option. 
Adopting PRE’s objectively baseless standard, which would require 
an act of Congress, would be a waste of both time and effort. Providing a 
pre-assessment challenge, which fits into the IRS’s mission to 
administer the tax laws, would allow the IRS to do its job while avoiding 
the First Amendment issues. 
2. Clarify the Law in Regulations 
Treasury should adopt regulations that provide explicit rules 
regarding how section 6676 should be implemented. As the Rand case 
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demonstrates, the absence of regulation can lead to unintended results, as 
demonstrated in the Three Stooges example above, with at least four 
different penalty combinations for what is essentially the same behavior. 
Such an outcome could have been avoided entirely had Treasury issued 
regulations mandating that refundable credits be included in 
underpayment calculations. 
The power to issue those regulations is well within Treasury’s 
purview.221 Generally, if a statute is deemed ambiguous about a 
particular matter, a regulatory agency is free to issue regulations 
clarifying the ambiguity.222 The fact that the Tax Court has ruled 
contrary to the IRS position should not be a hindrance to issuing 
regulations, because as long as regulation is entitled to Chevron 
deference (i.e., the statute does “directly address the precise question at 
issue”),223 the regulation can overturn a contrary judicial decision.224 
To make section 6676 more effective, two specific regulatory 
changes are warranted: (1) define underpayment to include refundable 
tax credits; and (2) exclude non-perfected refund claims from the 
penalty. 
a. Underpayment Definition 
The aftermath of Rand provided the IRS with a choice regarding 
how best to proceed in seeking to implement the section 6676 penalty: 
(1) appeal Rand and pursue what will likely be vexatious litigation 
around the country, or (2) issue regulations that include refundable 
credits in the underpayment calculation. One choice will be costly, time 
consuming, and wasteful; the other will likely resolve the issue once and 
 
 221. See Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 55 (2011), in 
which the Supreme Court held that courts (1) apply Chevron deference to Treasury regulations and 
defer to such regulations if they reasonably resolve a statutory ambiguity, (2) defer to all Treasury 
regulations, whether issued pursuant to the general grant of rulemaking authority or pursuant to a 
more specific congressional grant of rulemaking authority, and (3) ignore the history of the 
regulation, such as whether it represents a reversal of Treasury policy or whether it was issued in 
response to government litigation losses, in determining whether a regulation is valid. 
 222.  See Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Serv., 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005) 
(“Brand X”). See also United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836, 1843 (U.S. 
2013) (citing with approval Brand X’s holding that “it is for agencies, not courts, to fill statutory 
gaps.” Brand X, 545 U.S. at 982.). 
 223.  Chevron USA Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). Chevron 
deference requires courts to defer to an administrative agency’s regulations if Congress has not 
“spoken directly to the precise question at issue” and the regulation is based on a “permissible 
construction of the statute.” Richard Lipton & Russell Young, COURTS SPLIT ON VALIDITY OF 
SECTION 6501(E)(1)(A) REGULATIONS AFTER MAYO FOUNDATION, 115 J. TAX’N 21, 26 (2011). 
 224.  Lipton & Young, supra note 223, at 27. 
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for all. 
Assuming the IRS chooses to appeal Rand and wins (i.e., the court 
allows the IRS to include refundable credits in the underpayment 
calculation), little will be resolved. Pursuant to the Golsen rule, the Tax 
Court will follow its own precedent unless a case is appealable to a U.S. 
Circuit Court of Appeals that disagrees with it on a legal issue.225 Thus, 
the IRS would have to determine penalties on a circuit-by-circuit basis 
unless and until all circuits are in agreement or the Supreme Court 
resolves the issue. Such a strategy would unnecessarily burden both 
taxpayers and the IRS. In addition, based on its prior actions enforcing 
the section 6662 penalties, the IRS could choose simply to apply the 
penalty broadly and ask the courts to figure it out, generating vexation, 
and unnecessary litigation.226 
If Treasury instead issued regulations stating that any refundable 
credits should be included in “the amount shown as the tax by the 
taxpayer on his return” (the “X” in the underpayment calculation)227 and 
that such amount could be negative, the issue could be resolved. In fact, 
the Tax Court almost invited Treasury to draft a regulation, noting that 
the court was “not resolving the question of whether the Secretary may 
promulgate a regulation that is inconsistent with this Opinion.”228 
b. Penalize Only Valid Refund Claims 
The IRS should explicitly remove informal claims from the 
purview of section 6676 penalties. As noted above, the IRS has claimed 
in internal guidance (albeit without providing a legal basis) that informal 
claims for refund are subject to section 6676 penalties,229 and it has not 
 
 225. Golsen v. Comm’r, 54 T.C. 742, 756-58 (1970), aff’d on another issue, 445 F.2d 985 
(10th Cir. 1971). See also Moosally v. Comm’r, 142 T.C. 10, 16 n.7 (2014) (citing Golsen, 54 T.C. 
at 757) (holding Golsen “established the rule that this Court will ‘follow a Court of Appeals 
decision which is squarely in point where appeal from our decision lies to that Court of Appeals’”). 
 226. See TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERV., supra note 124, at 187 (report on improper section 
6662 penalty assessment after the 2012 guidance). To be fair, the IRS appears to be directing its 
attorneys handling refundable credit cases with section 6662 penalties to notify the taxpayer if the 
IRS is pursuing a larger penalty than what would apply under Rand. See 2013 TIGTA REPORT, 
supra note 9; see also Carl Smith, Another Update on Rand Cases in Tax Court, PROCEDURALLY 
TAXING (Feb. 6, 2014), http://www.procedurallytaxing.com/another-update-on-rand-cases-in-tax-
court/. 
 227. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-2(a)(1)(i) (as amended in 2007). 
 228. Rand v. Comm’r, 141 T.C. 376, 384-85 (2013). In a footnote, the court also stated that 
“[i]f the Secretary should promulgate such a regulation, we may be called upon to revisit that 
question, but judicial restraint dictates that we not resolve that question now.” Id at 385 n.6 
(citations omitted). 
 229. See Part IV.B. 
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publicly stated whether the penalty applies to protective claims. Neither 
informal nor protective claims should be penalized under section 6676. 
As a preliminary matter, the requirements for a valid claim for 
refund can be found in the Code and Treasury regulations, which set 
forth, in detail, what the IRS should consider a valid claim for refund. 
On the opposite spectrum are informal claims, where there are no 
statutory or regulatory definitions.230 What has emerged for informal 
claims, in the place of explicit laws and regulations, are equitable 
principles permitting taxpayers to extend the applicable statute of 
limitations in cases in which they failed to meet the requirements of a 
formal claim.231 
The problem for the IRS, if it seeks to impose penalties on informal 
claims, is that a taxpayer may, as noted above, point out that “claim for 
refund,” as set forth in the Code and Treasury regulations, has a precise 
definition, and that definition necessarily excludes informal claims. 
Thus, the IRS has no authority to penalize informal claims, because a 
plain reading of section 6676 excludes anything other than valid refund 
claims. Allowing the IRS to penalize informal claims gives it too much 
unchecked power against taxpayers who may lack the ability and 
wherewithal to challenge what would likely be viewed by a court as an 
illegal penalty. 
B. Change the Law 
If Congress could be moved to change section 6676 in order to 
make it a better penalty, at least three changes are warranted. The first, 
providing a reasonable cause defense, would make the penalty more fair 
for unsophisticated taxpayers while not impacting the IRS’s ability to 
penalize Fraudsters. The second, eliminating the economic substance 
penalty, would benefit the IRS generally by avoiding unnecessary, and 
potentially harmful, litigation. The last, providing a three year statute of 
limitations for non-fraudulent refund claims, would provide clarity for 
the Strivers, yet give the IRS the same ability to pursue Fraudsters it has 
with others forms of tax fraud. 
1. Provide a Reasonable Cause Defense 
As noted above, a reasonable cause defense was originally provided 
 
 230. See [Tax Practice and Procedure] Tax Prac. Series (BNA) ¶ 3890.01.C.3. 
 231. See Neilson, supra note 197, at 149 (“informal claim doctrine has been subjected to 
numerous interpretations, and courts have been inconsistent in determining what actually qualifies 
as an informal claim for refund”). 
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in the 2007 JCT Report, but was left out of the final bill.232 Generally, 
reasonable cause allows for legal and factual mistakes, whereas 
reasonable basis requires reliance on persuasive legal authority.233 As 
noted by the IRS, “the reasonable cause and good faith exception in 
[Treas. Reg.] § 1.6664-4 may provide relief from the penalty for 
negligence or disregard of rules or regulations, even if a return position 
does not satisfy the reasonable basis standard.”234 
For taxpayers seeking to navigate the rules regarding refundable 
credits, reasonable basis is too rigid a standard. When reasonable basis is 
first introduced in Treasury Regulation § 1.6662-3, it is in the context of 
the negligence definition, and is defined as the opposite of negligence, 
noting that “a return position that has a reasonable basis . . . is not 
attributable to negligence.”235 That language captures the essence of the 
problem with the reasonable basis standard in the section 6676 context: 
it is a black and white solution to a problem with shades of gray, and 
will ensnare too many taxpayers in its net. 
2. Remove the Economic Substance Penalty 
“The rich hire lawyers and accountants for a reason—to slip the tab 
and stick you with the bill.” 
—Pres. George W. Bush236 
The second change is to remove subsection (c), the penalty 
applicable to refunds based on transactions lacking economic substance. 
While arguably well-intentioned, more effective procedures exist to 
combat tax shelters, and the likely result of enforcing this portion of 
section 6676 will be to create bad precedent for the IRS. 
As a preliminary matter, section 6676(c) is ill-targeted. Generally, 
as noted above, taxpayers enter sophisticated tax shelters not to generate 
refunds but to avoid tax.237 That tax avoidance is generally done by 
 
 232.  See supra note 103. 
 233. See I.R.C. § 6664(c)(1) (2012); Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(a) (as amended in 2003); id. § 
1.6664-4(a). 
 234. See I.R.S. Chief Couns. Mem. 20125201F (Dec. 28, 2012). 
 235. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(b)(1). 
 236. President George W. Bush, Campaign Remarks in Mason City, Iowa (Oct. 20, 2004), 
available at http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/campaign/speeches/bush_oct20.html. For a list of 
other quotes, see DUBYASPEAK.COM, http://www.dubyaspeak.com/campaigner (last visited Apr. 5, 
2015). 
 237. See U.S. Tax Shelter Industry: The Role of Accountants, Lawyers, and Financial 
Professionals: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Investigations of the S. Comm. on Gov’t Affairs, 
108th Cong. 146 app. (2003) (“In the broadest sense, a tax shelter is a device used to reduce or 
eliminate the tax liability of the tax shelter user. . . . These transactions have no economic substance 
55
Wright: Bugus Refunds & Bad Penalties
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2015
3 - WRIGHT P547 MACRO (DO NOT DELETE) 10/21/2015  11:57 AM 
602 AKRON LAW REVIEW [48:547 
creating or inflating losses or deductions, not generating refunds.238 
Moreover, taxpayers who participate in tax shelter activity often have 
high incomes or large gains to shelter, and are generally ineligible for 
refundable tax credits, which often have income limits.239 
The originally-enacted section 6676 was narrowly tailored to 
address refund fraud. Extending the reach of the penalty to tax shelter 
transactions, done as a sort-of kitchen sink amendment in 2010, adds 
nothing to the IRS’s ability to combat bogus refund schemes, and may 
cause more harm than good. That harm would be in the form of bad 
precedent for the IRS regarding section 6676, generated by sophisticated 
taxpayers challenging the numerous flaws in the law. As Justice Oliver 
Wendell Homes stated long ago, “Great cases like hard cases make bad 
law.”240 
Section 6676 is particularly open to such bad precedent, because so 
many of the relevant terms in the penalty are undefined. This Article has 
identified a number of those issues: can the IRS penalize informal 
claims? what is the relevant statute of limitation? potential First 
Amendment issues? how should an “excessive amount” be calculated if 
there are multiple penalties? etc. The armies of lawyers representing the 
Gamers will find more, all at the government’s expense. 
The risk is even greater in this circumstance, because litigation of a 
section 6676(c) economic substance penalty would give taxpayers an 
added ability to define the contours of the codified economic substance 
doctrine. To date, the IRS has been cautious in its approach to applying 
economic substance penalties.241 Such caution is understandable, as 
economic substance has so much overlap with the other common law 
doctrines.242 Seeking to impose the section 6676(c) penalty would throw 
that caution to the wind. Moreover, as I hope to argue in an upcoming 
paper, the “any similar rule of law” language, if the IRS decides to take 
it off the shelf, gives the IRS ample tools to combat tax shelters. 
 
or business purpose other than to reduce or eliminate a person’s tax liability.”). 
 238. The U.S. General Accounting Office reported to Congress in 2003 that the tax losses from 
abusive tax shelters totaled $85 billion. See id. at 10 (statement of Sen. Frank Lautenberg). 
 239. In 2013, the income limit for the EITC was $46,227 for an individual with three or more 
qualifying children. See I.R.C. § 32(b)(3)(A) (2012). The FTHBC limit for individuals was 
$145,000. See id. § 36(b)(2). 
 240. N. Sec. Co. v United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 241. The IRS requires the economic substance penalties under section 6662(b)(6) to be 
approved by the Director of Field Operations before the penalty can even be proposed. See I.R.S. 
Guidance LMSB-20-0910-024 (Sept. 14, 2010), available at http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/
Codification-of-Economic-Substance-Doctrine-and-Related-Penalties; I.R.S. Guidance LB&I-4-
0711-015, supra note 87. 
 242. See supra note 58. 
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3. Create a Three Year Statute of Limitations for Non-Fraudulent 
Refund Claims 
A three year statute of limitations gives the IRS ample opportunity 
to address non-fraudulent refund claims. Moreover, it would provide 
clear guidelines for Strivers regarding the rules applicable to refund 
claims, and be consistent with the IRS’s own internal guidance. 
However, because taxpayers cannot rely upon that guidance, the statute 
of limitations should be formalized in law. 
Unlike Strivers refund claims, Fraudster refund claims do not 
deserve a defined statute of limitations. Current law and regulations 
provide that proof of fraud prevents the running of the statute of 
limitations.243 Consistent with that principle, penalties for fraudulent 
refund claims pursuant to section 6676 penalties should not be subject to 
a statute of limitations. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Section 6676 could be an effective penalty, giving the IRS the 
ability to discourage aggressive taxpayer behavior. However, poor 
drafting and implementation have hamstrung the IRS, and rendered the 
penalty relatively useless. The steps identified above would benefit both 
taxpayers and the IRS in fairly administering the penalty and avoiding 




 243.  See I.R.C. § 6501(c), providing that in cases of false and fraudulent returns, taxes may be 
assessed “at any time.” See also Evans v. Comm’r, 100 T.C.M. (CCH) 215 (2010); Hicks Co. v. 
Comm’r, 56 T.C. 982, 1030 (1971), aff’d 470 F.2d 87 (1st Cir. 1972). 
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